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Résumé
Les relations de travail et d'emploi sont devenues des enjeux importants en 
Chine. La Chine a ratifié 25 conventions internationales du travail et a travaillé en étroite 
collaboration avec l'OIT pour améliorer la sécurité et la santé au travail. Malgré ces 
efforts, la Chine est souvent critiquée pour des violations du travail. Face à ces 
problèmes, un système législatif d'administration de travail a été développé au niveau 
national. Mais l’application de ces règlements demeure problématique.. En particulier, 
les difficultés rencontrées par les inspecteurs du travail dans l'application de ces lois  
constituent un élément clé du problème. 
Notre mémoire s'intéresse essentiellement au rôle de l'inspecteur du travail dans 
l'administration publique de la sécurité du travail en Chine. Ces fonctionnaires jouent un 
rôle important et peuvent parfois exercer leur discrétion en tant qu'acteurs de première 
ligne, faisant d'eux de vrais décideurs politiques. Par conséquent, la compréhension de 
leur rôle et de leur discrétion dans l'application des normes du travail en Chine est 
cruciale. Notre mémoire est centré sur une étude de cas qualitative d'un bureau 
d'inspection du travail dans la région de Beijing.  Dans le cadre de notre recherche nous 
avons examiné le rôle des inspecteurs du travail au moyen d’entretiens semi-structurés, 
d’une recherche documentaire ainsi qu’à l’occasion d’une brève observation des 
inspecteurs sur lors de la visite d’un lieu de travail. Les résultats démontrent que la 
définition du pouvoir discrétionnaire des inspecteurs du travail de première ligne en 
Chine est un enjeu très complexe. L’étude de cas permet cependant d’élaborer un 
cadre permettant l’identification des facteurs critiques déterminants pour l'évaluation et 
la compréhension de la nature du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l'inspecteur du travail en 
application de la loi.
Mots clé: OIT, la sécurité et la santé au travail, discrétion, inspecteur du travail 
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Abstract
Labour and employment relations have become important issues in China. China 
has ratified 25 international labour conventions and has worked closely with the ILO to 
improve occupational safety and health. Despite these efforts, China is often criticized 
for labour violations. China has in response built a relatively complete legal and 
regulatory picture of labour regulations nationwide. The problem facing China today is 
enforcing these laws and regulations. A key part of this problem is the critical question 
of examining the challenges faced by labour inspectors in implementing these laws.
This research project focuses on the role of labour inspection in the public 
administration of work safety in China. These public servants play an important role and 
may at times exercise their own discretion as street-level actors, making them the real 
policy decision makers. Consequently, understanding their role and discretion in the 
application of labour standards in China is crucial. This research is a qualitative case 
study of one labour inspection office in the Beijing area and examines the role of labour 
inspectors through semi-structured interviews, documents, and a brief observation of 
labour inspectors on-the-job. The results indicate that defining the discretionary power 
of street-level labour inspectors in China is a very complex task, but a framework is 
developed through this case study to identify critical issues important to evaluating and 
understanding the nature of street-level labour inspector discretion in enforcement.
Keywords: ILO, safety and health at work, discretion, labour inspection
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: China, international labour standards and 
occupational safety and health
1.1 Introduction: China’s emergence in the global economy
 
Labour standards and the enforcement of labour protections have been 
global concerns for over one hundred years. With the increasing globalization 
of the world economy in recent decades, this concern has only grown. 
Governments interested in simultaneously pursuing social protection on the 
one hand and economic development on the other hand have resulted in a 
renewed focus on the issue of labour administration generally and labour 
inspection in particular. Casale and Sivananthiran (2010) noted this trend in a 
book on labour administration.    
Labour administration, in particular labour inspection, has enjoyed an 
increasingly high profile in recent years, both nationally and 
internationally. Much of the increased interest is from governments, 
recognizing that in a globalized world labour administration is a key actor 
in the elaboration and implementation of national economic and social 
policies (Casale and Sivananthiran, 2010; vi). 
With China’s emergence as a global economic power, the government 
has not remained isolated from these trends. This research project is an 
examination of one contemporary element of labour standards enforcement in 
China, the work of labour inspectors enforcing occupational safety and health 
(OSH) standards.
The development of China as the world’s workshop did not occur 
overnight. Industrialization unfolded in three stages before the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. These pre-1949 stages were the 
late Qing Dynasty, the Northern Warlords’ Government and the Nanking 
National Government. During these periods China’s industrialization 
developed with great difficulties and resulted in few achievements (Lu 2000). 
The period between the years 1949 and 1978 was the period of traditional 
socialist industrialization. The basic characteristics of this period included a 
highly centralized planned economy and a national economy with a low per 
2capita income. The goal was to establish an independent industrial system to 
meet domestic demand and entailed the abnormal development of heavy 
industry (Wen and Wu, 2006).
China’s industrialization thus began in the 1950s. Li and Vinten describe 
this early transformation very well: “From the beginning of the 1950s to the 
end of the 1970s, Chinese workers were under a highly centralized planned 
economy typical for many communist countries of this period, including the 
Soviet Union. Some industrial infrastructure was developed during this period 
and GDP growth was 5.5 percent” (1997). Despite development and 
industrialization, there were defects in resource allocation and structural 
conditions, namely discord between production and consumption as well as 
some disparities between light and heavy industries (Wen and Wu, 2006).
Political movements challenged this economic development. Some 
political movements such as the “Great Leap Forward” phase of rapid 
industrialization and the “Cultural Revolution” phase both, according to some 
historians of China, impacted negatively on the overall national economy. Li 
and Vinten explain that “by the time Chairman Mao died in 1976, the Chinese 
economy was on the point of collapse, with GDP being 4,536 million Chinese 
Yuan and a trade level of $7742.44 million compared with the figures of 1968-
1970” during which GDP had grown strongly (1997).
 In Mao’s closed economy, China was one of the world’s most isolated 
countries with a tiny share of international trade; with a tiny share of 
trade; commodities, especially oil, accounted for most of China’s 
exports. Foreign trade and exchange were under the monopolistic 
control of a central government ministry, which used the over-valued 
currency to support an economic policy of import-substitution 
articulated and administered by the central plan (Li and Vinten, 1997; 
187).
In order to stimulate domestic development, “striking changes took place 
in domestic and foreign economic policies that would ultimately lead to 
China’s emergence as a world economic power” (Li and Vinten 1997). This 
new period in Chinese economic history began roughly in 1978 with a new 
strategy of development focused on reform of the economic system. Deng 
Xiao Ping believed that “China could not become a modern industrial country 
3merely by importing foreign technology” (Li and Vinten 1997). He “advocated 
two major changes in the economic system: the transfer of decision-making 
powers to the producers, and the introduction, to varying degrees, of the laws 
of the market” (Li and Vinten 1997). National policy was working to move 
away from being totally reliant on the Soviet-style central planning strategy. 
Thus, certain market mechanisms were introduced (Li and Vinten 1997).
After 1978, China moved from a centrally planned socialist economy to a 
policy called a new hybrid of capitalism, referred to as being “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics”. These characteristics included many market-based 
economy mechanisms. As Li and Vinten note “since initiating these new 
economic policies in the late 1970s, China has continued to pursue the twin 
objectives of economic reform and the expansion of international economic 
ties through what it calls the ‘open-door’ policy” (1997). Since this time, 
Chinese industrialization has accelerated to an astonishing degree and 
achieved in economic terms remarkable success. The gross industrial output 
value of China increased by 28.5 times from 1978 to 2002. The Chinese 
production output of many industrial products is ranked first in the world (Ke 
2011). The result is a China that has developed a “generalized export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI) and moved towards a more successful economy 
through this process” (Li and Vinten 1997). 
After its much-anticipated accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001, China's growth developed even more intensively.
China entered a highly energy-intensive growth phase marked by a 
steady shift towards heavy industrial production and exports of 
materials such as steel, cement, aluminum and nitrogenous fertilizers. 
While overall efficiency has improved in many of these energy-
intensive industrial sectors, production volume has grown at an even 
faster pace. China today has become the world leader in cement, 
aluminum, iron and steel, ammonia and nitrogenous fertilizer 
production. China’s WTO accession and resulting trade relations has 
contributed to heavy industrialization in the last decade... Some 
industries like cement and steel, urbanization and infrastructure 
construction continue to be driven by domestic consumption (Aden et 
al., 2010: 21). 
Some figures give an indication of China’s remarkable growth in recent 
decades. Chinese per capita GDP reached US$3,266 as of 2007. To place 
4this in perspective, US$1,000 is considered to indicate a primary stage of 
industrialization with US$3,000 as a middle stage of the industrialization and 
US$5,000 as a late stage of the industrialization. Since GDP per capital in 
China had now reached over US$5,000 today, and the country is considered 
by these general economic guidelines to be in the middle to late stage of the 
industrialization (Ke 2011). According to the latest World Economic Outlook 
report, Chinese per capita GDP has reached US$5,417 (IMF 2011). Needless 
to say, these dramatic economic changes have also caused remarkable 
disruptions in society in general and in the social relations of production. 
Workers have been impacted by these trends in various ways, both positively 
and negatively.
1.2 Industrial and labour relations in China
When the PRC was founded in 1949, the characteristics of Chinese 
industrial relations during this post-1949 period included “the rejection of 
autonomous forms of workers’ organizations in favour of a single, centralized 
trade union federation” (Ali 2005). The importance of this decision continues 
to be felt across all Chinese workplaces today. The other major policy change 
that emerged from this period that continues to affect Chinese industrial 
relations was the establishment and support for state-owned enterprises and 
the “Iron Rice-Bowl” in employment policy. This decision was at the center of 
the country’s efforts to achieve productivity and at the same time the 
redistribution of basic necessities and services (Ali 2005).
The “Iron Rice-Bowl” policy was characterized by the idea and policy of 
lifetime employment. The rigid state planning mechanism that accompanied 
this policy deprived enterprises of the authority to recruit and dismiss 
employees. Employees were assigned to their work unit according to the state 
plan, where they might work there for their lifetime (Warner 1996). Salary was 
determined by various pre-determined schemes at the highest levels by the 
state without a direct link to worker performance. Mobility was discouraged 
(Warner 1996). 
Chinese economic planning unfolded as if the whole economic system 
was one large firm or organization. The economic system was dominated by 
the state owned enterprises (SOEs) with participation by collectively-owned 
enterprises (COEs) and firms owned by individuals (DPEs). Support was 
5channelled into the SOEs, leaving other types of firms fewer in number and 
significantly less capitalized and developed than the prioritized state-owned 
enterprises (Ali 2005). 
Perhaps the most important change for industrial relations, however, was 
the single, centralized trade union federation. China followed Russia and 
adopted the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) as the official 
intermediary between the workers and the party-state. The ACFTU had two 
functions: “the top-down transmission and mobilization of workers for labour 
production on behalf of the state and a bottom up transmission for the 
protection of workers’ rights and interests” (Chan et al. 2008: 110). However, 
the top-down transmission of Party directives regularly suppressed the 
bottom-up transmission relating to workers' rights and interests. The result 
was that workers had little means to channel their local grievances upwards 
through these trade unions, thus creating potentially explosive situations.
This industrial relations model has had important implications for Chinese 
society and economy. Industrial relations underwent significant changes since 
the end of the 1970s when Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door” policy to the West 
(and Japan) sought “Four Modernisations” (industry, agriculture, science and 
technology and defence) by the year 2000. In this new direction, vast changes 
included decentralized planning and decision making and the introduction of 
responsibility systems that emphasized individual accountability for 
performance that have taken place in China’s enterprises (Ding et al., 2000). 
Chinese economic reforms transformed labour relations in two directions. 
First, newly formed non-public owned sectors emerged such as joint ventures 
and private enterprises. These outpaced the publicly-owned sector while 
attacking the latter’s privileged status (Ali 2005). “These new enterprises have 
brought in stricter worker discipline, numerical flexibility by bringing in labour 
contract systems and have distanced themselves from the social burdens of 
unemployment, over-employment and worker welfare.” (Ali, 2005). 
SOEs have also undergone considerable changes. The Chinese 
government implemented three interrelated labour policies. First, the 
government introduced new labour contract systems which have impacted the 
different types of employment arrangements on the shop floor in all varieties 
of firms and across economic sectors. These new systems introduced 
6“contract system employees” to the enterprise level. Such employment 
contracts “must be for at least one year and have provisions covering major 
topics such as probation, job requirements, working conditions, remuneration, 
discipline and penalties” (Ali, 2005). In both the SOEs and COEs there are 
now mixtures of employment arrangements, including permanent, temporary 
and contract workers. “In foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), there is a mix of 
temporary and contract employees, and in individual owned firms there are 
only temporary employees” (Ali 2005).
A second important change made by the Chinese government for 
employment relations was moving the fixed wage system to a market 
productivity-based system, which ushered in more wage disparities. “The idea 
behind these wage reforms is that the performance should be linked with 
enterprise productivity and individual performance” (Ali 2005). The thought 
underlying these changes was that it was time to open up the labour-market 
and let the market determine wage levels. A third important change for 
workers came when the government decided to “marketize the social security 
system by transferring the basic responsibility of social welfare from work 
units to the individual” (Ali 2005). 
It is within this general employment relations backdrop, amidst rapid 
Chinese industrialization, that the government of China has decided to 
introduce more classic or traditional labour and employment law protections. 
In 1995, for example, a new labour law was enacted. The new law takes 
precedence over all previous laws and regulations on labour. It upholds basic 
rights of workers in China’s “socialist market economy” by codifying principles 
of “equal rights” in obtaining employment, selecting occupations, receiving 
vocational training, and in securing health and welfare benefits. This touches 
on very important aspects of industrial relations and human resources 
management across China.
The transition towards a market economy and the integration of China 
into the global market system has led to radical changes in the 
industrial relations environment within the country. In the planned 
economy, the reconciliation of the interests of workers, managers and 
the state was sought within an administrative framework guaranteed by 
the government and the Communist Party (Clarke et al., 2004: 235). 
7With China’s emergence and integration into the world market 
economy, this situation has changed. As one group of scholars has noted, 
“the development of the enterprise, and consequently the jobs and living 
standards of the employees, is subordinate to market pressure on 
management to be competitive in both domestic and global markets, and to 
secure increasing profits.” (Clarke et al. 2004). The overall result of these 
trends is that China is now an active participant in the global economic 
system, including all of the obligations and responsibilities for regulation and 
protection in the international trade regime and, more importantly, for 
international labour rights protections aiming to improve working conditions. 
1.3 China and the international labour standard system
Considering China’s colonial history, China’s labour and employment 
system has always held a degree of international influence. In the 
contemporary era of promulgating international labour and employment 
regulations, this influence is found today most notably through China’s 
participation in the ILO system. As one of the founding members of the ILO, 
the “Beiyang or warlord government” (a series of military regimes that ruled 
from Beijing from 1912 to 1928) had assigned their representatives abroad to 
participate in early International Labour Conferences. From 1929 onward a 
tripartite ILO delegation was assigned by the Kuomingtang government to 
attend the annual conference. Kuomingtang was one of the dominant parties 
of the early Republic of China starting in 1912, and remains one of the main 
political parties in Taiwan. In 1934, the government of China assumed a 
leadership role as a member of the ILO Governing Body. 
Since 1944 China has been listed as one of the ten countries of chief 
industrial importance, earning the nation one of the ten permanent seats on 
the ILO Governing Body. China’s seat at the United Nations was placed in 
question from 1945 to 1971 as the international community recognized the 
Republic of China as the rightful government. As a result, the relationship 
between the official Chinese government and the ILO was cut off during this 
time. As Kent noted, “in 1971, following the decision of the U.N. General 
Assembly to recognize the PRC as the only legitimate representative of 
China” the ILO Governing Body in turn made the decision to restore China as 
a member. Since this change in policy, China has participated more and more 
actively in the ILO system (Kent 1998). 
8Beginning in December 1978, Chinese economic reform policies and the 
manner in which they were implemented resulted in immense changes in 
Chinese society. Poverty was reduced as incomes increased and new 
industrial relations practices emerged. China’s overall national strength and 
international status has advanced since 1978. Despite being a large and 
powerful state, China was not a fully active member of the ILO in all regards. 
Positive efforts were made to change this situation between 1980 and 1982 
and the ILO Director General twice visited China to discuss closer 
participation in the international labour standards system. As relations 
between the ILO and China slowly warmed, the ILO decided in 1983 to cancel 
the accrued dues debt representing China’s membership contribution 
obligation back to 1971, including the arrears owed by Taiwan (Kent 1998). 
The following year an ILO assistant director-general from China was 
appointed. A member of the ACFTU also began occupying a worker delegate 
seat in the meetings of the ILO Governing Body (Kent 1998).
China’s increasing involvement with the ILO reflected a shift in China's 
attitude from about 1986 onward. China changed from a low-key to a more 
assertive role within the international organization, seeking to realize its 
power, both in the governing body as well as within the various technical 
offices of the ILO and as a member of various ILO committees. It also 
expanded its participation in ILO activities around Asia. Technical cooperation 
became a frequent forum for Chinese involvement in this period. In 1985, the 
ILO opened a branch office in Beijing. The ILO-Beijing office carried out the 
ILO’s programmes and activities in the PRC. In 1987, China became a 
member of the International Occupational Safety and Health Information 
Centre (CIS), providing workers and employers with the most up-to-date 
information regarding occupational safety and health available from the 
international community. Such technical cooperation was important to China 
and this style of cooperation continued to 1989 (Kent 1998).
By 1989, after a period of what Guy Standing referred to as the intellectual 
shrinkage of the ILO, China’s attention followed the ILO’s move from highly 
expert professional technical assistance, which was drastically curtailed, to 
the more traditional ILO activities of labour standards setting and supervision 
(Standing 2008). When the WTO started work in 1995, China had ratified only 
a small number of conventions. With the ongoing development of Chinese 
economic reforms, modernization and globalization, this shift in focus would 
9only heighten the importance of ensuring labour standards ratification and 
compliance by China through the ILO’s international labour standards system.
As a result of these changes and underlying historical context, the China 
government promulgated “The New Labour Law of the People's Republic of 
China” in 1994. This new labour law demonstrated China’s knowledge of and 
compliance with the basic ILO standards and principles governing tripartite 
dialog and collective bargaining. Article 7 of the new labour relations system 
provided that, in accordance with the law, “a trade union shall represent and 
protect the lawful rights and interests of workers and organize its activities 
autonomously and independently” (Labour Contract Law of PRC, Article 7). 
Article 8 of this law provided that each worker should “participate in the 
democratic management or consult on an equal level with his employing unit 
about the protection of lawful rights and the interests of workers through staff 
meetings” (Labour Contract Law of PRC, Article 8). The new labour law 
regime also endorsed other workers’ rights, much to the chagrin of some 
employer associations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Barboza 2006). 
China’s participation in the ILO system has continued. As of 2012, China 
has ratified 25 Conventions, of which 22 remain in force and thereby placing 
China under the ILO’s supervisory mechanism. By comparison, Canada is a 
party to 32 ILO labour conventions that are in-force and the United Sates is a 
party to 14 labour conventions in-force (ILOLEX 2012). Workers’ rights are 
now one of the crucial social issues recognized as a policy priority by the 
Chinese government. This concern is evidenced by the increasing intensity of 
China’s communication and partnership with various ILO bodies, a trend that 
likely will become more and more important as China modernizes and 
develops going forward into the future.
1.4 Occupational health and safety in China
As China has been experiencing rapid industrialization and economic 
growth, a transformed industrial structure and expansion of the labour force 
has resulted. OSH regulations have emerged as an important area of labour 
law, policy and services of concern to China (Christiani et al. 2002). 
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China promulgated two important acts of legislation in 2002. First was the 
Law of the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety. Second was the Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on Occupational Diseases Prevention and 
Control (Arrigo et al. 2011). Currently there are “over 80 different statutes of 
differing legal quality” in force relating to occupational safety and health. 
These include laws such as the Law on Safety in Mines, Coal Law, Electricity 
Law, Fire Prevention Law, Law on Road Traffic Safety, Law on Emergency 
Response, in addition to some 27 administrative regulations on OSH, 
including the Regulation on Work Safety Licensing, Hazardous Chemical 
Safety Management, the Reporting, Investigation and Treatment of Work 
Safety Accidents, and Safety Management of Large-scale Group Activities 
(Arrigo et al. 2011).
From a national OSH supervision and administration perspective, two 
particular administrations have been established, the State Administration of 
Work Safety (SAWS), established in 2001, and the State Council of Work 
Safety Committee, established at the same time. The SAWS is responsible for 
enforcing the laws on occupational safety and health. At the same time, the 
State Council of Work Safety Committee is headed by a Vice-Premier with 
members composed of the heads and deputies of the State Council’s 
Ministries and Agencies (Arrigo et al. 2011).
Worker safety and health supervision and administration lags far behind 
the pace of economic development. Unsafe working conditions and 
occupational diseases and injuries in mining and in labour intensive 
manufacturing industries dominate both Chinese and foreign media reports. 
Between 2008 and 2010, for example, the number of Chinese coal miners 
contracting occupational diseases rapidly increasing, reaching a peak after 10 
years (Chen et al. 2010). This figure gives only a small indication of the 
situation that exists behind the curtain of China’s economic miracle. 
Compared with other developed countries, the current situation of China's 
occupational safety and health is not optimistic and holds room for much 
improvement.  Figure 1 shows this sharp spike in comparative form. 
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Figure 1. Ten-year tendency of the caseload of coal miner’s occupational 
diseases in China and the US.
1.5 The Chinese ratification of ILO Convention No. 155
At the same time as China began the process of market reforms that 
ushered in a period of economic expansion and industrialization, a significant 
body of international instruments and guidance documents were being 
developed by the ILO in the area of occupational safety and health. OSH has 
always been an important issue of concern in the global labour standards 
system since the ILO was founded over 90 years ago. The 1970s witnessed a 
renewed interest in worker safety and health policy, however.
Despite this long history of treatment in international labour law and 
decades of experience by the ILO, safety and health has remained elusive on 
the global level as evidenced by global statistics. Protection is still very difficult 
to achieve for decent, safe and healthy working conditions in practice. 
According to one global estimate “every day, 6,300 people die as a result of 
occupational accidents or work-related diseases – more than 2.3 million 
deaths per year. 317 million accidents occur on the job annually; many of 
these resulting in extended absences from work” (ILO 2011). Statistics 
indicate that even today working conditions for the majority of the world’s 
workers are not optimistic. “Progress in bringing occupational health to 
industrializing countries is painfully slow” (Ladou 2003). Even in some of the 
poorest countries, there has been no progress at all (Ladou 2003).
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 The ILO has worked to raise worker health as a priority internationally 
and to meet the challenge by promoting global awareness of the importance 
of worker safety and health (ILO 2009). These efforts include adopting 
conventions and recommendations and offering technical assistance 
programmes. A large number of ILO activities have occurred on topics such 
as child labour, the growing informal economy, gender mainstreaming, labour 
inspection, specific sectors of activity such as shipbreaking, HIV/AIDS and 
migration. Each includes at their foundation a central focus on safety and 
health or a key occupational safety and health component.
The International Labour Conference (ILC) has adopted more than 40 
international labour standards the ILO says specifically deal with occupational 
safety and health topics. These are in addition to over forty Codes of Practice 
prepared and updated by the office on specific worker health and safety 
topics. Indeed, nearly half of ILO instruments deal either directly or indirectly 
with safety and health issues (ILO 2013). ILO conventions guide countries in 
the promotion of workplace safety and in managing policies and programmes 
related to workplace safety and health. Many of the most important and 
fundamental principles of OSH are found in two or three key ILO conventions. 
These include Convention No. 155, concerning OSH and the working 
environment, Convention No. 166 on occupational health services, and 
Convention No. 187, the promotional framework for OSH. These conventions, 
once ratified by national governments, have the force of international law. 
They entail a moral and legal commitment by each country to enact domestic 
legal and social policy changes to ensure national policies and practices move 
into compliance with the provisions of each labour convention (ILO, 2009). 
ILO conventions are often times accompanied by a recommendation not 
open for ratification but which elaborates on the obligations assumed by a 
country when it ratifies the related labour convention. Recommendations can 
also be adopted by the International Labour Conference without the adoption 
of any accompanying convention. This international system of labour treaty-
making and the detailed ILO supervision of compliance is the international 
system in which China is now an active participating member.
In addition to the international labour standards, the ILO has also adopted 
a large number of Codes of Practice. These attest to the great degree of 
professional expertise available through the ILO system on safety and health. 
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They provide guidance on OSH in certain economic sectors, on certain 
hazards, and regarding certain safety and health measures. One example is 
the Guidelines on occupational safety and health management systems, ILO-
OSH 2001, a Code of Practice that is one of the major strategies to enhance 
application and implementation of ILO standards (Takala 2002). These 
guidelines are the only OSH management principles developed with principles 
defined through a tripartite consensus. This approach is said to provide an 
advantage for developing better occupational health and safety practices. 
Despite the host of tools available to the ILO, among the most important 
of the ILO’s strategies on occupational safety and health is Convention No. 
155. Adopted in 1981 and entered into force on 11 August 1983, the labour 
convention outlines fundamental principles on occupational safety and health 
and the need for the creation of a national occupational safety and health 
policy. As of August 2012, 59 countries have ratified this important 
convention, a number that increases every year and includes many key 
developing world economies like Brazil, Turkey and Mexico (ILOLEX 2012).
The central organizing theme of Convention No. 155 is the 
implementation of a national policy focused on prevention rather than reacting 
to the consequences of occupational accidents and diseases. “National policy” 
is a common term and is said to connote a cyclical process with different 
stages implemented at recurring intervals (ILO 2009). Subsequent sections of 
Convention No. 155 focus on how to implement these policies at the national 
level and at the enterprise level. The convention also gives employers and 
workers in the enterprise certain specific responsibilities for managing worker 
health and safety (Zhu et al. 2004).
To demonstrate its commitment to improving OSH and prepare for 
ratification of Convention No. 155, China convened a seminar in 2001 about 
Convention No. 155 with the collaboration with the ILO. Two years later, the 
ILO-CIS National Center for China carried out comparative study projects 
between ILO Convention No. 155 and the Chinese laws and regulations on 
safety and health that were on the books at the time (Zhu et al. 2004). This 
study also included a Feasibility Analysis on Applying Implementation of ILO 
Convention No. 155. During this comparative study, the ILO-CIS National 
Center for China undertook a lot of research on the status of ratifying ILO 
Convention No. 155 in the various countries, including the major problems 
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faced in implementing the convention, and how to prepare for implementing 
ILO Convention No. 155 in China and so on. This conference and subsequent 
research was important for the ratification of Convention No. 155. It led to a 
national tripartite workshop held in 2006 specifically on Convention No. 155 
that was run in close collaboration with the ILO (Zhu, 2007). Finally, after 
years of effort and discussion, China ratified Convention No. 155 in January 
2007, a landmark development in international OSH law related to China and 
a remarkable accomplishment for the overall ILO labour standards system.
Before the ratification and due to planning, China learned that a majority 
of the provisions of Convention No. 155 were already reflected in Chinese 
laws that had been promulgated and in related regulations. For instance, 
Article 40 of the Production Safety Law makes reference to Article 17 of 
Convention No. 155 (Zhu et al. 2004). Furthermore, a number of activities for 
raising awareness of OSH are organized by authorities at the national and 
provincial levels (Zhu et al. 2004). These involve both management and 
workers. The social partners in China have also been active in promoting 
OSH. The ACFTU developed its own safety and health strategy that it 
implemented through its networks (Zhu et al. 2004). These measures 
altogether played a positive role in the process of promoting China’s 
ratification of Convention No. 155, making the ILO’s supervision of China 
under the convention less likely to focus on the formal legal changes needed 
to comply with the convention and more so on the on-the-ground translation of 
the fundamental OSH principles into real-world work practices at workplaces.
This introductory chapter has provided the general background for this 
project. The next chapter focuses on the main theme of this research, street-
level bureaucrats and occupational safety and health enforcement in China. 
OSH is a critical issue for China and one of the important topics addressed in 
the international labour standards system. China’s rapid industrialization over 
the last generation has prompted work to modernize national labour policies in 
response. China has pledged to the world to move Chinese labour policy into 
conformity with Convention No. 155 in law and in practice. To this end the 
Chinese government is under international supervision by the supervisory 
bodies of the International Labour Organization. Because these changes must 
occur not only in formal law but also in real-world practice, on-the-ground 
where people work, how labour inspectors do their work to enforce these legal 
obligations at the very grassroots level is thus not only a concern for workers 
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at risk, employers and governments.  Their actions are also a concern for the 
international community and anyone interested in the enforcement of basic 
labour protections defined in the international labour and human rights 
system. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Street-level bureaucrats and the enforcement of 
international labour standards in China
2.1 Introduction: Street-level bureaucrats as complex policy actors
This chapter reviews the academic literature surrounding the main focus 
of this research, the experience and discretion of street-level labour inspectors 
in China. A number of themes are covered here. These include the history 
and development of the concept and focus on street-level bureaucrats or 
public servants in social research related to administrative science, the re-
locating of these debates within the general debates on the enforcement of 
international labour standards, and the challenges countries face when 
implementing labour standards under a competitive economic globalization, 
and, finally, the contextualization of all of these academic debates within the 
real world context of Chinese industrial and labour relations. Throughout this 
literature review I work to focus the debates on the key questions relevant to 
my study.  I attempt to succinctly summarize this focus in the concluding 
section of this chapter.
All public policies are implemented at the local level. This fact makes the 
struggles and challenges faced by the public servants involved in the 
administration of public policy an important object of study for social scientists. 
Where substantial discretion in the implementation of any policy exists, these 
public service workers or bureaucrats themselves hold policy-making power. 
As a result of these important social and policy dynamics, sociologists and 
public administration scholars have identified and recognize the agency held 
by these local actors. Among the concepts that have emerged is the notion of 
‘‘street-level bureaucrats’’ and the study of the nature of their discretion, how 
they respond to inadequate resources, how the performance of these officials 
is assessed, their relationship with non-voluntary clients, alienation from 
clients and their own professions, as well as numerous other research 
questions.
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Street-level bureaucracy was coined as a sociological concept in the 
1970s by Michael Lipsky, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Professor Lipsky was interested in studying public service 
workers in response to the perceived sense of a growing hostility in American 
society against government bureaucracy (Lipsky 1971, Weatherley and Lipsky 
1977, Lipsky 2010). The publication of the book Street-level Bureaucracy: 
Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services in 1980 led to the concept 
receiving wide attention across the social sciences. It continues in circulation 
today after being re-published in 2010 by the Russell Sage Foundation. Given 
the breadth of how the concept has diffused, a comprehensive review of the 
academic literature on ‘‘street-level bureaucrats’’ is not possible. According to 
the online citation search website Google Scholar, for example, Lipsky’s 
original book on street-level bureaucracy has, as of September 2012, been 
cited by other academic works over 5,761 times.
Citizens have numerous contacts with public authorities in their day-to-day 
lives. These interactions involve many different types of individual 
transactions. For instance, people seek social benefits or government permits 
or licenses of one variety or another. People hand in our tax return or are 
ticketed for various infractions now and again. When this happens, citizens 
must deal with large organizations that handle thousands of such individual 
cases on the basis of various routines related to public administration. Public 
service workers occupy a critical position within these interactions because 
they are the location where policy ideas translate into practices in the real 
world. Bovens writes, “between the individual citizens and large “decision-
making factories” is the street-level bureaucrat” (2002). These public servants 
apply a variety of national or sub-national law, policies, rules, regulations or 
other administrative procedures (Bovens, 2002). Although the final decision in 
a case is formally handed down by a higher executive agency,
It is the street-level bureaucrats, police officers, welfare workers, 
adjudicating officials, tax inspectors, and police officers who, in 
practice, decide to grant a benefit payment, lay down the conditions 
attaching to a permit or determine assessment (Bovens, 2002).
The public service employees above are called “street-level bureaucrats” 
each of which functions according to a particular logic. Michael Lipsky began 
defining the term in the late 1960s as “public service workers who interact 
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directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial 
discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky 1980). It is now understood in 
the field of public administration that millions of decisions are made at this 
basic "street" level by public service workers. Their choices and decisions 
have a significant impact on the ordinary citizens’ daily lives and on the 
implementation of official policies.
As a result, public policy comes alive in the daily practice of street-level 
bureaucracy. The reality is far more complex than the legislators writing the 
law and policy could have ever imagined. This situation opens the real 
possibility of discretionary powers for the street-level bureaucrats. These 
public servants become more than the faceless implementing agents of 
policy-makers. These street-level acts by bureaucrats can even make policy. 
Lipsky explains this phenomenon.
The decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, 
and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work 
pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out. I argue 
that public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-
floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it 
is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-
level workers (Lipsky, 1980: xii).
The discretion of street-level bureaucrats is a key issue in the 
implementation of public policy. There is a significant difference between 
street-level bureaucrats and other bureaucrats in the implementation of public 
policy. Street-level bureaucrats must constantly make decisions and judgment 
when they interact with citizens. Laws and guidelines must be interpreted by 
street-level bureaucrats and when this occurs, they create the organization’s 
real policy (Lipsky 2010). As a result, “unlike lower-level workers in most 
organizations, street-level bureaucrats have considerable discretion in 
determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions 
provided by their agencies” (Lipsky 2010). The exercise of discretion is thus 
fundamental and necessary for street-level bureaucrats to do their work 
(Duner and Nordstrom 2006). 
Discretion does not mean that street-level workers are unrestrained by 
rules, regulations, and directives from above. On the contrary, the major 
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dimensions of boundaries of public policy, for example, the nature of rules, 
any regulations and the basic services are shaped by policy elites and political 
and administrative officials. “These influences establish the major dimensions 
of street-level policy and account for the degree of standardization that exists 
in public programs from place to place as well as in local programs” (Lipsky 
2010). The lack of a transparent set of outcomes, autonomy and less 
supervision can also lead to broad interpretations of the goals and objectives 
which street-level bureaucrats may take advantage of in order to adjust 
policies to meet their own situation-specific goals. Piore and Schrank argue, 
for example, that one of the limitations of labour inspection in the Latin world 
is the difficulty of monitoring and evaluating the inspectors’ decisions in a way 
that can ensure consistency and equity of treatment across all enterprises that 
are regulated over time (2008).
Academic research on street-level bureaucracies is still in an early stage 
and relatively less frequent in China. One obvious difference is that street-
level workers in China are administrative law enforcers considered civil 
servants. The teachers or social workers that Lipsky studied and classified as 
street-level bureaucrats are not considered civil servants per se in China. For 
example, according to Article 14 of The Civil Servant Law of People’s 
Republic of China, civil servant posts shall “according to the nature, features 
and necessity of administration of civil servant posts, be classified into such 
categories as comprehensive administrators, technological professionals and 
administrative law enforcers” (Civil Servant Law of PRC, Article 14). So, there 
is a different type of classification of workers in China than in the west, yet the 
street-level character of these functions nevertheless exists where they 
interact with the public and implement policies in practice on the ground. 
Many street-level civil servants in China enforce various administrative 
laws whose functions are market supervision and social management. These 
functions often only exist at the primary level of these organizations. Among 
the most important street-level public servants regulating the private market 
economy is the labour inspector. Labour inspectors and officers from different 
levels of work strive to regulate occupational safety and health. They are key 
administrative officials with street-level bureaucratic functions that operate in 
many locations all across China. As China strives to develop its national 
labour policies in accordance with international standards, studying these 
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street-level bureaucracies and their unique dynamics in China are important 
questions. 
2.2 Factors that have influenced street-level public servants
Although street-level public servants are complex actors and do hold a 
degree of discretion, it is also important to recognize that environmental or 
external factors also restrain the degree and nature of discretion of the street-
level bureaucrat. Focusing in greater detail on the Chinese context and on 
labour inspection within the Chinese context in particular, specific factors can 
be identified that do likely serve to limit or shape the discretionary authority 
and functioning of most Chinese labour inspectors. First, I identify some of 
these factors from the general literature on street-level bureaucracy. Next, I 
identify specific features of the new Chinese labour and employment relations 
context that are likely to affect the discretion of labour inspectors. This project 
then articulates a conceptual framework that merges these two groups of 
factors in a cohesive way that will allow for applying this unique research 
framework into the Chinese context. Thus to begin, we identify from the 
general literature on street-level bureaucracy some of the commonly cited and 
discussed factors that have influenced discretion.
Inadequate material resources
One fairly universal factor is the problem of scare resources. Street-level 
bureaucrats feel that “their own resources are chronically and seriously 
insufficient” (Winter 2002). Policy decision makers are constrained by the 
costs of obtaining information to their resources, by their capacity to absorb 
information, and by the unavailability of information. The lack of resources is 
extremely severe in China. According to a 2006 survey China suffers from a 
severe shortage of trained labour inspectors. State Administration of Work 
Safety has approximately one officer for every 35,000 workers (Tunon 2006).
Scarce resources for law enforcement capabilities continue as other 
important developments in labour relations unfold across China. Since 2003, 
labour conflicts between workers and capital have been increasing. According 
to a survey, the number of labour dispute cases increased from 19,098 in 
1994 to 226,000 in 2003, and the number of workers involved increased from 
77,794 to 800,000 during the same period (Chanet al. 2008).
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   In 2005 alone, the number of labour dispute cases accepted and heard 
by labour dispute arbitration committees at all levels of government 
reached 314,000 and involved 744,000 workers. Among these cases, 
the number of collective labour dispute cases hit 19,000 and involved 
410,000 workers. Most of disputes were classified as involving labour 
remuneration, economic compensation, and insurance and benefits 
(Ngok 2008). 
Worse still, because local governments are obsessed with economic 
growth, they tend to stand up for capital and oppress labour. These local 
conditions can serve to limit the actions of labour inspectors across China, 
even not allowing labour inspectors to enter the factories and exacerbating 
resource scarcity among these public servants (Yue and Zhuang 2009).
Performance measurement and evaluation
Lipsky’s original treatment of street-level bureaucrats indicated that the 
job performance of public servants is extremely difficult to measure (Lipsky 
2010). The reasons for this difficulty are the lack of quantitative assessment of 
bureaucratic performance and that the current evaluation measures are not 
efficient or are otherwise inadequate (Lipsky 2010). To some extent, a 
bureaucracy itself may be defined as a large organization whose output 
cannot be evaluated through market-type transactions. This view 
distinguishes public bureaucracies from otherwise private business 
organizations, whose behaviour is in a sense assessed through profitability. 
Nevertheless, the challenge of performance measurement was recognized 
early on as one of the factors influencing street-level bureaucracy, 
necessitating evaluation and assessment tools that were sensitive to the 
particularities of these dynamics and the general qualitative nature of how 
street-level bureaucrats function in different social contexts.
Difficulty evaluating performance is a characteristic of bureaucracies. This 
tendency becomes obvious when studying the work of street-level 
bureaucracy. One explanation for this difficulty is that goal ambiguity, intrinsic 
to street-level bureaucracy work, affects performance measurement (Lipsky 
2010). There are too many variables to take into account in performance 
measurement, the public may grant differing degrees of deference and 
autonomy to street-level bureaucrats in decision making, street-level 
bureaucrats tend to perform in jobs that are freer from supervisory scrutiny 
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than most organizational jobs, and work norms prevailing in these job 
minimize such scrutiny (Lipsky 2010).
Although the performance of street-level bureaucrat is hard to measure 
and evaluate, bureaucracies do establish standards and measure worker 
performance against these standards (Lipsky 2010). For instance, as for a 
labour inspection organization or a work safety administration, the more work 
the public servant does, the more problems such as illegal employment he or 
she will find, regardless of whether the issues they measure indicate an 
increase or decrease in better or worse work performance. So, for example, 
more labour inspections become the quantitative measure by which to 
evaluate performance, regardless of effectiveness. Lipsky gives a similar 
example tied to police work and social workers: 
Policemen typically are asked to make a certain number of arrests per 
month. Social workers are asked to maintain a certain monthly intake 
and case-closing rate. But these measures are only problematically 
related to public safety, or to clients’ ability to cope with problems that 
are in part the objectives of these interactions. And they have nothing 
to do with the appropriateness of workers’ action, or the fairness with 
which they were made, the net results of which determine the rates on 
which workers are judged (Lipsky 1980: 50).     
To sum up, when we are not able to measure correctly the performance of 
street-level bureaucracy we cannot monitor and control effectively their 
discretion, and thus the overall implementation of a public policy may be 
challenged or impeded altogether. Thus the ILO practice of seeking 
conformity with international labour standards in both law and in practice 
would seem to require the qualitative focus on street-level public servants and 
the nature of any discretion they may exercise. In the case of China and the 
implementation of the ILO’s Convention No. 155, this means in part a turn to 
the qualitative study of the work of street-level labour inspectors.
China does have specific performance measures for civil servants. 
Ordinary civil servants at different times, places and conditions of use are 
evaluated based on different standards. China’s unique public servant 
assessment system cannot meet all different purposes. The civil servant law 
of PRC provides a fundamental framework of performance measures, job 
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assignment, and remuneration, whose main purpose is to improve policy 
implementation. In places where the cadre of responsibility operates as 
designed, a local government assigns a variety of their own targets to its 
subordinates when the public servants assume office. Read Article 33 of the 
Labour Inspector Law of the PRC: 
In the assessment of a civil servant, the morality, capability, diligence, 
achievement, uprightness thereof shall be assessed in an all-round 
manner according to the power limit of administration, where focus 
shall be put on the practical achievements of his work (Labour 
Inspector Law of PRC, Article 33). 
This framework is clearly too broad and leaves much to the discretion and 
the interpretation of the labour inspector. Should different departments use a 
different standard? Should different areas with different functions have 
different evaluation system and standards depending on the work? These 
questions remain unanswered. 
Another problem is unsound incentive mechanisms. Peng and Su have 
interviewed 70 public service personnel from a community health service 
organization in Beijing in order to study the public servant performance 
measurement system. The result indicated that one of the existing problems 
was an imperfect incentive mechanism. They argued that within the same 
organization, the difference of performance pay grade between different 
positions were negligible or differed very little (2011). Almost everyone was 
able to get their merit pay. Furthermore, what constituted the wage was not 
clear (Peng and Su 2011). The ambiguity and uncertainty of the organization 
goals and thus the national policy goals trickles down to merit pay decisions. 
This ambiguity clouds the challenge public servants face but also indicates the 
environment is one of high discretion due to this lack of clarity in goals and 
objectives. The lack of and the unavailability of effective performance 
measures in street-level bureaucracies can at times allow workers to exercise 
their own discretion.
The non-voluntary nature of the clientele
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The relationship with clients is also one of the key factors that determine 
the way in which street-level bureaucrats implement policies. The clients of 
street-level bureaucracies are non-voluntary clients. They are in a legal or 
structural sense likely obligated to interact with the public servant. This point is 
obvious in coercive public agencies because street-level bureaucracies often 
supply essential public goods and services which citizens cannot obtain 
elsewhere (Lipsky 2010).
Health care and legal services can be obtained privately but only at 
relatively high cost. Poor people are forced to seek assistance through public 
agencies or not to seek assistance at all. The migrant worker in China is a 
typical example. Zong and Zhu interviewed 897 migrant workers; the results 
showed that 89 percent of the migrant workers could afford less than 600 
yuan ($100) a year on medical expenses, with an average of only 50 yuan 
($8) per month. When they get sick, 2 percent prefer to stay at home rather 
than go to the hospital, 20 percent of migrant workers go to the pharmacy to 
buy medicine, and 27.7 percent go to private clinics. Most of these clinics 
have no business license (Zong and Zhu 2007). Because of the expensive 
medical charges, more than 50 percent of them do not go to the public 
hospital.    
The result of these non-voluntary social dynamics is that the participation 
of the clients is non-voluntary and thus the client has less power and cannot 
decide to readily change a public service worker on their own accord (Lipsky 
1980). There is no way on an institutional level that those clients can discipline 
street-level bureaucracies and street-level public workers. Street-level 
bureaucracies therefore often have nothing to lose by failing to satisfy clients, 
although there are different local situations that could in some way alter these 
dynamics. As a rule however, the public bureaucracy is an organizational form 
that is different than a private market organization where a single customer 
can, at least in theory, punish the organization by buying service elsewhere.
Alienation
Lipsky uses the word ‘‘alienation’’ to describe street-level bureaucrats at 
work and their work relationship (Lipsky 1980). 
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Worker alienation summarizes several concerns including the extent to 
which the worker makes decisions about the work, has control over 
what is made and how it is fashioned, and the influences the public 
servant has on the final disposition of the product. Sometimes, 
alienation also refers to the extent to which workers are able to express 
themselves, or the need to which they are required to suppress their 
viewpoints, including their creative and human impulses through work 
activity (Lipsky 2010: 75).
 Street-level public servants are thus inevitably going to make some 
compromises or concessions when protecting clients’ rights and interests. As 
a result, the dynamics of alienation reduce the extent to which the street-level 
worker is able to respond to the clients in a fully human way. 
Clients are the main objects for street level bureaucrats and public 
servants are alienated from clients during their work time. Four specific 
dimensions of alienation have been mentioned in the literature. Public 
servants tend to work on only a small segment of the overall product of their 
work. They are in effect Taylorized in that their work is often rationalized and 
broken into parts, and to a degree deskilled away from their work, further 
alienating the worker from the work result (Lipsky 1980). Third, the public 
servant is a public servant; they do not control or own the raw materials with 
which they do their work. They are employees, not owners. Finally, “the public 
servant at the street-level does not control the pace of their work” (Lipsky 
2010: 78). Work is often compartmentalized and thus increasing the pace can 
be easily requested by upper management based on some factors 
management feels corresponds to performance (Lipsky 2010).
In Chinese official government documents the phrase “relevant 
departments” is used widely to refer to the responsible parties. However, this 
phrase is vague to the general public seeking assistance. It also causes 
street-level bureaucrats to pass the buck and avoid direct responsibility. The 
absence of specific, clear laws and regulations worsens this phenomenon. For 
instance, labour inspectors lack a variety of coercive measures and local-level 
authorities. Inspectors do not have the writ of search, and they cannot arrest 
the suspect like law enforcement agents, making the investigation and 
evidence collection process more difficult. This is, however, used as an 
excuse that street-level bureaucrat use to pass the buck or responsibility to 
other agencies not responsible for labour standards.
26
The factors identified in this section are common across the literature on 
street-level public servants. In addition to alienation, performance 
measurement, the non-voluntary relationship with clients, and limited 
resources, numerous other environmental or external factors also influence 
the work of public servants depending on the social, economic and political 
context. Labour inspection in China, for example, has unfolded in a period of 
dramatic changes in the economy and structure of the labour market. 
Examples of these changes are the emergence of dispatched workers, part-
time employment, and the migrant worker, all of which makes the current 
labour market very complicated. 
Street-level bureaucrats work with a relatively high degree of uncertainty 
in China because of the complexity of the subject matter and the people they 
serve. Turning to the question of China and the identification of China-specific 
issues in labour standards enforcement, we try to identify China-specific 
factors that would influence street-level bureaucrats in Chinese labour 
inspectorates. Following the section on these Chinese factors, this literature 
review moves into a discussion of broader debates on labour standards 
enforcement in labour and employment scholarship. It then concludes with a 
summary of the salient issues of concern and the key research questions 
related to street-level bureaucrats and labour inspection in China that this 
research project will investigate. 
2.3 China-specific issues cited in labour standards enforcement
China is an excellent case study to determine if the current international 
context of global competition is conducive to upholding labour standards and 
improving employment relations (Frenkel 2001). While China has ratified four 
of the eight core conventions and a number of other ILO standards, there are 
also clear challenges for the Chinese government in labour standards 
enforcement. To begin to try to understand the Chinese context, five topics of 
importance will be discussed here: Migrant workers and the Hukou system 
controlling internal migration, the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, protests and the fragmented labour movement, the use of 
dispatched workers, and the more general complexity of Chinese government 
and bureaucracy.
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Migrant workers and the Hukou system
A meaningful analysis of rural–urban migration in China cannot be made 
without making reference to the Hukou system, which affects the migration 
experiences of many migrant workers in the cities (Chan et al. 1999). The 
Hukou system was established in the 1950s. The Hukou system “registers 
every person at a specific place, and requires all changes in residence to be 
registered with and approved by both the government of the place of origin 
and that of the destination” (Chan et al. 1999). 
  This policy on internal migration in China became even more restrictive 
when the Chinese government introduced the food stamp system 
which provided low-priced rationing of foods to each individual residing 
in his or her place of residence. There were two main consequences 
that resulted from implementing these new policies. First, it became 
almost impossible for an individual to move from one place of 
residence to another. Second, the division between rural farmers and 
urban city dwellers was widened, with the rural farmers lagging behind 
in economic and social resources (Wong et al. 2007).
Indeed, entitlement to public and social services depends entirely on the 
type of Hukou held by the individual. As an urban resident, a person is entitled 
to have employment, health care, housing, pension and food subsidies. None 
of these basic privileges, however, are available to people with a rural 
registration (Fang 2007). 
With the introduction of a socialist market economy and establishment 
of the responsibility system in rural China, it has become very difficult 
to restrict people from migrating to the cities. Unfortunately, the Hukou 
system has done little to accommodate to the changing economic 
situation in China. As the previous analysis indicates, the Hukou 
system has been largely responsible for creating a marginalized group 
of migrant families, and in turn employees, who are not allowed to 
enjoy the same employment, housing, health and welfare benefits as 
the legal urban residents in China (Wong et al. 2007).
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Most of the migrants go to the urban cities in the eastern coastal areas of 
the country where they can find more employment than back home in the 
western and central inlands (Wong et al. 2007).
Migrant workers are a special group in urban cities in China. They need 
economic opportunities, particularly in the major cities, and they do not enjoy 
the rights of urban residents and are not sufficiently protected either inside or 
outside of work (Shi 2008). They take up jobs that the urban residents are 
unwilling to do and live in very poor housing conditions. Their children do not 
have access to public school systems in their adopted home cities. All this 
information points to the fact that rural migrant workers are a marginalized 
group within urban China (Wong et al. 2007).
The specialization of migrant works and the Hukou system makes labour 
protection difficult for the street-level public servant. Evidence to this effect 
can be seen from two angles, employment and working conditions first and 
second, access to social security systems and benefits, including medical 
benefits.
Little overlap is found between migrant workers and local residents across 
industries and occupations. Unlike urban residents, who are primarily 
employed in manufacturing and other industries, rural migrants are 
concentrated in service and construction industries (Shi 2008). Moreover, 
most migrant workers take up physically demanding jobs as manual 
labourers, textile and garment factory workers, toy factory workers and service 
workers. Migrants mainly occupy jobs that local residents disdain (Fang 
2003). Unsurprisingly, these jobs are often more dangerous and hazardous 
than other jobs that are held by the legal urban residents, placing these 
migrant workers at greater risks.
Another of the characteristics of rural migrant workers is their low 
educational attainment (Shi 2008). According to statistics collected by the 5th 
national census during the year of 2004, 42.09 percent of the employed 
population obtained middle school education and below, 33.58 percent have 
obtained high middle school, and 24.33 percent have obtained junior college 
and above (He and Song 2011). This is a great challenge in developing labour 
protection because ‘’they do not know how to protect themselves and do not 
know that working in a poisonous environment violates their rights’’ (Chan 
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2001). These migrant workers have little knowledge and lack information 
about how to gain protection by accessing their basic rights at work. 
Coupled with a lack of knowledge of their legal rights, migrant workers 
have been subjected to a great deal of exploitation. To begin with, quite a 
large number of migrant workers complained of delays in wage payment, 
which is a tactic used by the factories as a way of preventing the migrant 
workers from leaving freely (Tan 1998). It is therefore not surprising to find 
that conflicts relating to overdue salaries between employers and migrant 
workers occur fairly frequently in China. Indeed, drastic measures such as 
strikes and holding managers or employers hostage have been taken by 
disgruntled migrants. 
The working conditions of rural migrants are also disconcerting. Migrant 
workers are perceived as cheap labour and are paid a very low wage. A 
number of small factories have even refused to reimburse workers for their 
medical expenses. Yet, in some foreign-invested enterprises, the owners are 
not willing to do anything to protect the health of migrant workers, putting 
these people in hazardous environments with dust, toxic substances, noise 
and poor ventilation. Migrant workers are often powerless and have little 
government protection. Invariably, this is related to their official status of 
migrant workers living in urban cities under the Hukou system in China (Wong 
et al. 2007).
In China, social welfare benefits are closely tied in with one’s residence 
status within the Hukou system. Therefore, migrant workers are excluded from 
social security and medical benefits in the urban cities because they are not 
official residents of cities. Although it is compulsory for employers in urban 
cities in China to contribute to unemployment funds set up by the government, 
these funds apply only to the local residents. Migrant workers who work in the 
very same work units are not entitled to these unemployment benefits. Thus, it 
is not surprising to find that respondents in one study mention the lack of 
social security protection as a source of stress (Wong et al. 2007).
Some scholars have tried to analyze the possibilities of the abolishment of 
Hukou system. However, the conclusion is that the Hukou system, directly 
and indirectly, continues to be a major wall in preventing China’s rural 
population from settling in the city and in maintaining what is called the rural–
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urban ‘‘apartheid.’’ The current system is still very relevant in present Chinese 
society today and most certainly influences the discretion and decision-
making of all street-level public servants, including the labour inspectors.
Freedom of association and collective bargaining
China’s trade unions are on paper the largest in the world in terms of their 
membership. They have altogether over 103 million members in more than 
586,000 primary trade union organizations. All of these worker-members 
belong to the social state-sponsored union federation. This was, and remains, 
the only body permitted to represent Chinese workers since the “Liberation” 
when the Communists took power nationally in 1949. Independent unions may 
not freely organize, and if they attempt to do so are vigorously suppressed. 
Although there is no official “right to strike” (the right was deleted from the 
Chinese Constitution in 1982), there is an elaborate arbitration and 
conciliation machinery for dealing with workplace disputes (Wong et al. 2007).
The official Chinese trade union body is the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, established in 1925. There are thirty-one subordinate federations of 
trade unions under the ACFTU in China, which are based in each province, 
autonomous region, and municipality directly under the Central Government. 
There are sixteen national-level industrial unions. The supreme organ of union 
authority is the National Congress of Trade Unions, which is convened once 
every five years. The ACFTU Executive Committee, composed of 258 
members, is the ruling body when the National Congress is not in session 
(Daniel et al., 2000).
In theory, the ACFTU can take a leading role in pressuring enterprises to 
comply with the new standards and laws. In practice, however, the ability of 
the union to do this is severely curtailed, for several reasons. In its current 
form, the union is neither legally empowered nor practically capable of 
organizing workers and is unlikely to have the capacity to do so any time in 
the near future. This inability prevents it from playing an active role with regard 
to protect the workers, leaving a shop-floor vacancy where a traditional union 
steward might play a key enforcement role. Furthermore, the ACFTU has no 
presence in many foreign invested or private companies that disables its 
effectiveness completely in those enterprises. There is, in short, a significant 
gap between labour theory and practice (Pringle and Frost 2003). Freeman 
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has argued that China’s government-controlled trade union monopoly is a 
major obstacle in China’s inability to enforce its laws. Despite these 
limitations, Chinese unions are sometimes able to influence the outcomes of 
labour disputes positively and to protect workers’ interests. Overall, there are 
major challenges remaining.
Protests and fragmented labour movements
The hands of China’s workers have been strengthened by the new labour 
law introduced in 2008 and by the more fundamental laws of demand and 
supply (Economist 2010). For instance, on coasts, where its exporting 
factories are clustered, bosses are short of workers and workers contest 
conditions. According to one survey, during the first quarter of 2008 alone, the 
labour courts in Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangzhou accepted more than 
10,000 cases, double the number over the same period the year before (Lan 
and Pickles 2011). A spate of strikes has thrown a wrench into the workshop 
of the world. The waves of taxi drivers’ strikes in 2008 and of auto workers’ 
strikes in 2009 and 2010 were directly inspired by the new law (Lan and 
Pickles 2011).
Although labour protests are frequent, the scale, which is often limited to 
one factory or in one city, does not form a cross-boundary labour mobilization. 
In others words, labour mobilization remains mostly atomized, cellular, 
localized and therefore fragmented (Lee 2007). Lee has compared labour 
protests in the northeast rustbelt and the southern sunbelt of China. Protests 
of desperation refers to the pattern of activism in Liaoning by veteran state-
sector workers, whereas protests against discrimination sums up the mode of 
resistance in Guangdong by young migrant workers employed in private and 
foreign-owned firms (Lee 2007). He has found that in both regions, worker 
protests share the characteristics of targeting local officials, cellular activism, 
fragmentation of interests, and the interesting adoption of a legalistic rhetoric. 
These shared dynamics of labour protest can be traced to the overall 
state strategy and tensions of decentralized legal authoritarianism (Lee 2007). 
Labour protests in these different regions do not show any tendency to form a 
coalition. The internal organizations and interests also remain more 
decentralized and cellular. The occasional inter-departmental or cross-
regional labour movements cannot change the overall characteristics of the 
32
workers’ movement. Some worker demands, such as improvement of the 
working environment, could be met or partially met in the whole enterprise or 
in part. These efforts appear unable to, however, fundamentally change the 
status of all workers and whole industries. Atomized worker protest is the rule. 
Complex national enforcement strategies
The chain of responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the laws is a 
crucial aspect of the Chinese regulatory state and environment. In short, it is 
quite a complex system (Pringle and Frost 2003). There are three main, 
interrelated vehicles for implementing labour law: Enforcement by government 
agencies, dispute resolution processes, and monitoring by the official trade 
union organization. In China, the burden for ensuring that labour laws are 
enforced is placed even more heavily on administrative agencies than it is in 
many other countries. Most labour law norms as with very many legal rules in 
China, take the form of classic "command and control" regulations." Legal 
instruments are promulgated by the state and an agency is charged with 
implementing them after setting out a range of various sanctions that that 
agency or another state agency can impose if the rules are violated. 
The main institutions responsible for implementing labour law are the 
"labour administration departments above county level" which means that 
local labour departments have jurisdiction over most aspects of labour law 
within their area, with the important exception of occupational safety and 
health (Cooney 2006). The new labour law requires labour departments to 
"supervise and inspect" employer compliance with labour regulations. They do 
so through inspectorates established in the principle provincial / municipal 
departmental offices and in local branch and sub-branch offices. 
Labour law confers certain powers on local governments. However, local 
protectionism bureaucracy appears at the same time. The ILO Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations observed in 
2007 that the policies and instructions set out by central government were not 
being implemented at the local level. The CEACR also noted that many 
occupational safety and health inspectors are only temporarily employed, and 
are thus inexperienced and lack adequate and appropriate training. The 
observation from the International Trade Union Confederation submitted to the 
ILO mentioned that political pressure from the various local governments is a 
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problem out of a concern for protecting the government‘s interests as well as 
that of the leading companies in the region (NORMLEX 2007).
Another obstacle is that the sanctions that labour inspectorates deploy 
against egregious violators are weak. Firms using low-skilled migrants as 
mentioned in the first point have been especially prone to violate the law as 
the workers have, at least until recently, been unable to use any labour market 
related pressures to compel the employer to act lawfully. Threats to exit the 
enterprise unless the law is obeyed have carried little weight because of 
China's huge labour surplus, although recent unskilled labour shortages in 
certain cities and sectors may indicate that poor working conditions have at 
last deterred migrant workers.
General administrative and legal lacunae
Law in China is by no means irrelevant to the country’s political, economic 
and social systems; it has come to be the primary regulatory tool for 
regularizing the exercising of administrative power and for mediating the 
various social and economic relations (Cooney 2007). The new labour law is a 
major legislative achievement, yet on closer examination, however, it has 
serious limitations. It provides only “the skeleton of a regulatory framework, 
with its articles either supplemented by subordinate legal instruments 
produced by various State agencies (which number in the thousands) or left 
unelaborated” (Cooney 2006). 
Cooney studied the underpayment of wages. He supposes that according 
to labour law “they do not define wages. They do not spell out how they can 
be varied. They do not provide for wage records to be kept and given to 
employees. They do not explain what forms of labour service generate an 
entitlement to wages” (2006). Another problem is that the law applies only to 
certain categories of workers, namely to "workers (laodongzhe) who form a 
labour relationship (laodong guanxi) with enterprises”. “This phrase sets the 
boundary between those workers to whom the labour law standards apply and 
those whose work relations are governed by the general contract law” 
(Cooney 2006). However, some problems emerged. As Cooney noted: “it is 
not clear how it should be applied to work relationships that could be 
categorized as either employer-employee or as to independent contractors or 
dispatch workers” (Cooney 2006).
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Chan has noted that the laws are not necessarily flawless. There are still 
no specific laws regarding three-capital enterprises (three kinds of investment 
enterprises) industrial safety protection and insurance (Chan 2001). Although 
one may always consult the laws drawn up for state enterprises, in practice, 
government department personnel feel that there are no laws and regulations 
to fall back on their work. There are important dynamics that are faced daily 
by the various street-level public servants working to enforce these laws. The 
fact that the clarifying provisions are scattered through a range of legislative 
instruments, the status of which is not always apparent, means they are 
neither readily accessible by the employers who are supposed to comply with 
them, nor the employees whose interests they are intended to protect 
(Cooney 2007).
Another lacuna of the law can be seen from labour dispute resolution. 
Labour disputes are treated quite differently from most other forms of legal 
disputes in that complainants do not have direct access to the courts. Labour 
arbitration is conducted by labour disputes arbitration committees (LDACs). A 
party who is dissatisfied with labour arbitration may file for a hearing in their 
local People’s Court, but they cannot bring a case to a court unless the 
arbitration procedure is completed, or the LDAC has declined to hear the 
matter (Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on Trial of Labour Disputes). 
Thus, whereas in most cases where a person seeks recovery of a debt, court 
proceedings can be initiated directly, this is not possible for workers seeking 
to recover an amount owed under a labour contract (Cooney 2007). 
Furthermore, LDACs do not have their own assets or administrative staff, and 
are usually dominated by government (i.e. labour department) 
representatives. The employer and the employee representatives often do not 
participate in proceedings and are in any case nominees from state-owned 
enterprises or from the state-controlled union, respectively. Thus, “the 
distinction between state-initiated enforcement of labour law (through the 
labour inspectorate) and worker-initiated enforcement (through independent 
dispute resolution) is blurred in practice” (Cooney 2007).
Altogether these challenges in the Chinese context make the 
improvement of labour protection difficult for street-level public servants. 
These workers whose rights and interests have been violated find there is no 
“applicable law” and enterprises have various avenues for suppressing 
workers by exploiting these lacunae or through other means. Identifying the 
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obstacles facing street-level bureaucracy in Chinese labour inspection is 
important to understanding their real-world experience and evaluating the real 
challenge of labour protection.
The increasing use of labour dispatch services
Dispatched worker employment is the name given to the temporary 
staffing industry in China. Labour hiring occurs where a firm (the user firm) 
has work performed by workers that it purports not to employ, but rather 
obtains from another firm (the labour hire firm) which “dispatches” those 
workers to the user firm. The new Labour Contract Law has a strong impact of 
dispatched worker. For instance, “all dispatch workers must be engaged 
under fixed term contracts of a duration of not less than two years. The labour 
hire company must ensure that the dispatch workers receive at least the 
minimum wage on a monthly basis, even when they are not placed” (Cooney 
2007).  
These provisions are nevertheless remarkable. However, its critics 
consider how the current law uses only eleven (11) terms in one chapter to 
adjust the legal relationship between worker, the user firm and the labour hire 
firm who are involved in labour dispatch, obviously it could not satisfy the 
requirement of reality development (Yan 2010). Furthermore, the industry 
rests on a triangular employment relationship between private employment 
agency, employees, and the corporate customer. This triangular employment 
makes a labour inspector’s work more complex. 
2.4 Enforcing labour standards in globalized capitalism
China is at the center of the debate about capitalism and the enforcement 
of basic labour and human rights standards. Most scholars believe that with 
the influence of economic globalization, intense competition reduces 
international labour standards, which leads to a reverse competition (Xia 
2010). The most powerful argument is the famous “prisoner’s dilemma” 
analysis where the ratification of high labour standards is the best choice of 
two countries. However, low labour standards can bring benefits to one 
country and the country who first gives up high labour standard and adopts 
low labour standards first will get the benefits. The result is that both of these 
two countries continue to adopt low labour standards, keeping both countries 
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stuck in a system of labour and employment and offering poor working 
conditions in perpetuity. This is the classic dilemma often applied to globalized 
economics.
According to Skak, due to three problems in developed countries, this 
reverse competition is inevitable: 
Firstly, fear of a loss of competitiveness in international trade may 
ignite social dumping, being the means by which countries try to 
maintain international competitiveness and payment imbalances by 
reducing labour standards. As the redressing of one country’s 
imbalance implies an upcoming imbalance for other countries, 
competing social devaluations could turn into a race to the bottom of 
social standards. Secondly, high social standards may attract people 
from regions with lower standards and create immigration into regions 
with high standards. Such immigration causes an increase of taxes to 
pay for the standards, and taxpayers will react to this with a request for 
lower standards. Finally, on international capital movements, more 
strict labour standards increase labour costs reduce return to capital 
and thus create downward stickiness of wages because capital will 
move towards countries with low standards. Consequently, countries 
with high standards will be hit by high unemployment and low 
production and react to this by lowering their standards (Skak 2005). 
These arguments demonstrate the challenges faced by international 
labour standards from what scholars describe as the “economic barriers” to 
effective and strong labour standards enforcement.
On the contrary, Elliott and Freeman are representative of the positive 
competition view. In their book Can Labour Standards Improve Under 
Globalization? they argue this point from two aspects:
First, opposition by global enthusiasts and the absence of a social 
clause in trade agreements notwithstanding, trade pressures contribute 
to improved labour standards in some less developed countries 
(LDCs).Second, globalization has promoted international cooperation 
mechanisms. The ILO provides advice on how to develop these rules 
and assists in training workers’ (and employers’) organizations on how 
best to take advantage of them through technical assistance” (Elliott 
and Freeman 2003). 
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Freeman argues trade and labour taken together can do more than either 
can do separately (Elliott and Freeman 2003). Thus, labour standards can be 
enforced and are possible within economic globalization.
Some scholars also find evidence of positive competition from this social 
reality. According to Lee, there is no clear evidence that globalization has 
caused a lowering of labour standards in industrialized countries. The 
available empirical literature suggests that trade with low-income countries 
has, contrary to popular perceptions, in fact been only a relatively minor factor 
behind the rise in unemployment and wage inequality (Lee 1996). 
Some Chinese scholars point out that global capital competition improves 
the labour standards of the host country. Liu et al. have found that in the 
market-seeking case, low labour standards in a developing country are clearly 
unlikely to be an important determinant of a multinational’s choice of 
investment location. In the cost reduction case, however, they may be, but 
even in this case, multinationals are likely to be restrained in their choice of 
labour standards. Large companies will generally be concerned with their 
“social image” in home and host countries. As a result, they are likely to and 
do set standards in their overseas operations in reference to those in their 
home country. Although this need not mean that they will necessarily set 
standards exactly comparable to those in their home country, their concern 
with their image leads them to set standards above those prevailing in a host 
country (Liu et al. 2004). These studies each introduce complexity into this 
debate and challenge the basic race to the bottom thesis.
Some other scholars argue that labour standards and international 
competitiveness are closely linked. Beers has examined whether differences 
in labour stands’ strictness among OECD countries affect export flows among 
these countries (1998). If bilateral trade flows are distinguished according to 
differences in skill intensities, a significant negative impact is found on export 
of labour-intensive and capital-intensive commodities that are produced with 
relatively more high-skilled labour. If labour-intensive exports are produced 
with relatively more low-skilled labour, no significant effect could be found. 
Furthermore, a positive significant effect is found on capital-intensive low-
skilled exports. This means that theses exports are mainly coming from 
countries with relatively high labour standards. Substitution of capital for low-
skilled labour is said to be an important explanation (Beers 1998). Thus, it is 
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concluded that there is a close and a complex relationship that exists between 
labour standards and economics.
The race to the bottom thesis is one of the oldest justifications used for 
international labour standards. According to this view, labour standards 
prevent the exploitation of labour in order for one country to gain a trade 
advantage. The scholars holding this view argue low standards are a tool to 
achieve national protection. Others conversely argue competitiveness in 
international trade can lead to substandard labour conditions that constitute 
unfair trade practices. For example, coerced labour may be viewed, from the 
perspective of international competitiveness, as a means of gaining an unfair 
advantage in the international trade arena (Flanagan 2003). This is the race to 
the bottom thesis that dates as far back as the founding of the ILO in 1919.
Scholars contest this view and advocate high labour standards. Krugman 
has argued that high labour standards contribute to national productivity. He 
interprets the demand for the harmonization of standards from the point of 
view of the political economy. “If one country imposes a costly regulation while 
others do not, the world price will remain unchanged and all of the burden will 
fall on producers” (1997). Since producer interests are typically powerful 
political lobbies, this creates strong incentives for governments to seek policy 
harmonization in multilateral trade arrangements as a means of reducing the 
burden of trade liberalization on affected producers (Krugman 1997). Others 
still consider acceding to global labour standards will cost poor countries their 
comparative advantage (Elliott and Freeman 2003). Fields has analyzed 
international labour standards and decent work from the perspectives of the 
developing world. He has noted articulate statements of opposition to labour 
standards coming from developing countries. For example, a statement from 
India’s Commerce and Industry Minister: 
The Western world, the industrialized world, wants to take away our 
comparative advantage. It is a pernicious way of robbing our 
comparative advantage. The developing countries consider it as a 
maneuver by wealthy nations to force our wages up, to undermine our 
competitiveness (Flanagan, 2003: 69). 
Such views argue that standards damage national economic 
development, thus compliance with international labour standards would 
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damage the interests of small and less-powerful countries (Xia 2010). Some 
see labour standards as being imposed on countries through trade and other 
multilateral agreements (Patel and Baboo 2007). Stephen analyzed data 
collected for 116 countries in order to understand the relationship between a 
country’s political and economic power and its decisions to enforce 
international labour standards. The empirical results suggest that, all else 
equal, powerful countries are less committed to labour standards than less-
powerful countries (Deloach et al. 2006). The result suggests a relationship 
between economic development and avoiding the enforcement of labour 
standards.
Others argue that violations of core labour standards exert two other 
effects on trade flows. First of all, they decrease wages, thereby improving 
competitiveness. Secondly, child or forced labour leads to an increase in the 
unskilled labour endowment. This latter effect improves a developing country’s 
comparative advantage in intensive-intensive goods and fosters exports. 
“Both effects have the same result: low labour standards are pro-trade” 
(Granger and Siroen 2006).
At the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999, more than one hundred 
members from the developing world opposed international labour standards, 
saying that they can’t afford them (Hensman 2011). Hall has investigated the 
claim “developing countries are currently ready for more stringent labour 
standards” by examining the timing of labour standards adoption in highly 
developed countries. Each of the countries was once as poor as today’s 
developing countries and made the trade-off between labour standards and 
income historically. His conclusion has showed that labour standards are 
highly inappropriate for developing countries at their current income levels, 
and at the income levels they are likely to experience for many future 
decades. Given prevailing labour law in Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, 
current labour laws should be eliminated rather than creating new ones 
(Leeson 2007). Flanagan similarly noted how existing labour conditions in a 
country, as well as the size of the trade sector, the prevailing legal system, 
and the dominant religion combined to influence the ratification of ILO 
conventions (Flanagan 2003).
Other scholars confuse the debate further by arguing that there is not 
necessarily a relationship between international labour standards and 
40
international competitiveness. Elliott and Freeman observe that globalization 
by itself is not a universal remedy for underdevelopment and that developing 
countries can improve their labour standards without endangering their 
comparative advantage in intensive-intensive products (2003). In general, 
they cite studies that find no link or positive association between the level of 
labour standards and economic growth and no consistent relation with labour 
costs. Some do find a link between relatively lower labour standards and 
exports of low-wage textiles and apparel, but these results are not robust and 
may suffer from problems of multi-collinearity and omitted variables. 
Other debates on labour standards enforcement are more directly 
pertinent to a study of street-level labour inspection in China. One of the 
critical issues that emerge in the literature is whether we should set and 
enforce labour standards at the global level, seeking an international 
harmonization (Xia 2010). Some scholars support the establishment of a 
harmonization of labour standards and others are against the idea of 
harmonization. Here, international institutions play an important role in 
implementing harmonization. The international actions of these institutions 
influence directly the implementation of labour standards. 
Other studies show no reliable evidence that high labour standards 
reduce a country’s share of FDI. Given the evidence mentioned earlier that 
ratification is not associated with higher labour costs, this result should not be 
surprising. Indeed, discussions of the potential costs of labour standards turn 
attention from the possibility that some labour standards may raise the 
productivity of investment by improving the quality of human capital. 
Ratification of ILO conventions is only one of many potential government 
influences on FDI. The government actions to reduce risks associated with 
expropriation and uncertain contract status and to reduce its own presence in 
the economy will have a much more powerful effect on FDI shards (Flanagan 
2003). 
At a minimum, we can conclude that the debate between competitiveness 
and labour standards enforcement remains unresolved and that sufficient 
complexity exists about the role of globalization. Although this is far from an 
exhaustive review, the important question one can distil from this literature is 
that the issue of whether labour standards and rights at work can be enforced 
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in an internationally competitive global economy remains yet unsolved. The 
role of international institutions, however, remains an important focus of study. 
2.5 Labour standards enforcement and international institutions 
On a fundamental level, the need for international labour standards 
transcends economic arguments and has been described as part of the need 
for international human rights standards generally (Flanagan 2003). The 
theory underlying the international human rights idea is that human beings are 
universally entitled to a certain minimum standard of treatment (Gross 2003). 
The human rights idea incorporates a number of basic labour rights. The first 
international human rights treaty—an effort to abolish slavery—was also a 
labour rights movement issue (Humphrey 1973). Various work-related rights 
are included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International 
Bill of Human Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). 
Flanagan has argued that the core labour standards, freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour, and the elimination 
of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, are fundamental 
human rights in the workplace. The ILO recognized these protections in the 
1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998). 
They are said to form an obligation of membership of the ILO and should be 
honoured in developing countries as they should everywhere (Flanagan 
2003). On the other hand, as a practical matter, certain important labour 
standards—earnings levels but also minimum wages, maximum hours of 
work, mandated fringe benefits---must be allowed to differ across countries. 
These latter standards should be determined within countries and not by 
international mandate, in this view, because the ratification of ILO conventions 
depends on domestic costs of ratification, the openness of the economy to 
international trade, and the culture and norms of a country (Flanagan 2003). 
Nonetheless, there is agreement that standards can be arrived at and agreed 
upon to be universally protected in all countries.
International institutions play an important role in setting and helping 
countries enforce labour standards. What international action should be taken 
with regard to labour standards, how this action should be organized, and by 
what means should it be enforced, are all included here. Two such institutions 
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are the WTO and the ILO. At one level, the WTO and the ILO are similar 
institutions as each serves as an international negotiating forum for its 
member governments. On another level, these institutions are quite distinct. 
The central purpose of the ILO is to improve labour standards. The central 
purpose of WTO negotiations and agreements is to reduce trade barriers or, 
at its core, to increase market access and liberalize trade, actions that may 
confound labour standards. 
On an international level, the ILO has become increasingly active in a 
particular way since the WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration. Social 
clauses have been introduced in trade agreements. This evolution feeds 
debates regarding whether labour standards should be included in the 
framework of WTO rules and form a basic floor in the global trading regime. 
This debate indicates that the linkage between labour standards and trade 
remains active internationally.
Critics of any labour-trade linkage claim that they and linkage opponents 
are concerned to promote two distinct objectives—maximizing the gains from 
trade and reducing disadvantage, imaginably by promoting improved labour 
standards and higher employment, and that the best approach for achieving 
these goals would be to dedicate an independent institution to achieve each. 
They argue that at the international level, the concerns of workers are best 
served by promoting them through an independent agency, such as the ILO, 
rather than by confusing the mandate of the existing institution held by the 
WTO that is presently charged with fostering the growth of world output 
through reducing trade barriers by charging the same international 
organization with also protecting labour rights (Barry and Reddy 2006). Some 
scholars argue that the labour standards issue should be taken up in other 
agencies such as the ILO and The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 
If labour standards are included into the framework of WTO rules, the 
argument goes, the ILO will be sidelined, marginalized as an expert agency 
(Barry and Reddy 2006). 
Linkage opponents have also proposed that if a problem associated with 
labour standards is a market-access problem the solution should be sought in 
the WTO, otherwise its solution should be sought in the ILO (Flanagan 2003). 
The WTO has had over 50 years of experience in handling market-access 
problems. The ILO’s involvement in international labour issues has been 
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broadly defined through its history and from the beginning included concerns 
about race-to-the bottom and regulatory-chill mentality as well as concerns of 
a humanitarian and political nature related to labour policies and human rights 
protections. The ILO does not appear to have any particular expertise in 
addressing market access issues like the WTO. The ILO does have 
considerable expertise in addressing the details of national labour laws and 
enforcing labour standards should unfold, providing highly professional 
technical assistance on various labour topics.
What this implies in this debate is a reassignment away from the ILO and 
a focus toward the WTO. This would leave the ILO with what is in principle a 
more narrowly defined labour agenda separate from macroeconomic policy 
and trade policy. In practice, however, the breadth of the labour issues taken 
up by the ILO and the nature of the solutions it has attempted might seem little 
changed under such a reassignment. A tighter focus might even strengthen 
the ILO’s ability to achieve its fundamental objectives of seeking to protect 
workers and enforce international labour standards (Flanagan 2003). 
Granger and Siroen promote linking trade and labour standards. They 
think labour standards should be included into the framework of WTO rules. 
They conclude with four reasons:
The first reason is the “demand” for a trade labour linkage can be 
based solely on economic arguments without referring to human rights 
altruism and more generally any moral arguments. Second, “negative 
trade sanctions are not the only measures enhancing labour standards. 
Pressures to improve labour standards come from all variety of actors, 
market incentives, international aid or even domestic labour and human 
rights activists are other means of improving labour standards. Finally, 
although the ILO is the qualified institution to deal with labour issues, 
the WTO is not excluded whenever labour standards are a matter of 
concern for trade. Today, various labour standards are mentioned in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements which only confirm the 
importance of the issue as a universal value (2006). 
Freeman has proposed a compromise on this debate. WTO should 
address egregious violations of labour standards that are intended to increase 
exports or attract foreign investment, but otherwise should not be involved 
with labour standards. The ILO’s role is promote and oversee labour 
standards, develop, adopt and supervise the international labour standards 
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that are then ratified by member states that make a commitment to make the 
domestic legal changes in accordance with these standards to enforce them 
in practices (Elliott and Freeman 2003). While the academic debate on the 
proper role of these international bodies continues, the international ILO 
system continues to function even after a generation of economic 
globalization, with countries around the world working to implement and 
enforce labour standards in their domestic policy regimes. This commitment to 
basic labour and human rights likely means that the ILO will continue to be an 
important source of the technical assistance needed by national governments 
to improve the enforcement of labour standards in practice into the future.
2.6 Conclusion: Questions for street-level labour inspection
The literature review above provides an overview of what can be found in 
the research literature pertaining to several topics relevant to the current 
thesis. China’s rapid industrialization made her actively engage with the ILO 
and international labour standards. Western scholars and researchers have 
paid more attention to the relationship of China and the ILO from a human 
rights point of view. Chinese industrial relations scholars have focused upon 
the circumstances surrounding the ratification of the ILO’s core conventions 
and other international labour standards. Still other scholars have examined 
the challenge of implementing international labour standards while 
maintaining a globally competitive economy. Health and safety at work has 
been a subject of study in its own right and an important topic in Chinese 
labour scholarship.
Labour protection is becoming a more and more important issue for 
China. Since China has a relatively comprehensive, rationalized and logically 
ordered framework of labour administration and regulation. The challenge 
China faces is the problem of enforcing the law on the books. The key factor 
of OSH law enforcement is the street-level labour inspector. They are a typical 
example of the street-level bureaucrat. Lipsky had indicated that street-level 
bureaucrats can indeed be the real policy makers. They exercise discretion in 
decisions about citizens with whom they interact and their actions add up to 
agency behaviour (Lipsky 2010). Little attention has been paid to the concept 
of the discretion and influence of labour inspectors as street-level bureaucrats. 
Accordingly, the big issue of this research project is to explore the role of 
street-level bureaucrats in the Chinese system of labour inspection, exploring 
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the nature and latitude labour inspectors hold in China. The aim of this project 
is to in part create a conceptual framework that links the concept of the labour 
inspection service / labour inspector and the street-level bureaucrat literature, 
in addition to exploring this relationship through a qualitative case study in one 
locale in China, thus contextualizing this linkage for the Chinese legal context.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY
Conceptual framework, research methods and data 
analysis
3.1 Introduction: Key research questions
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework and the social research 
methodology of this study. This includes a statement of the research question, 
a presentation of the general philosophical orientation of the study, the 
conceptual model including concepts and their operationalization, the specific 
research methods, the working hypotheses, a discussion of research validity 
and the scope and limitations of the research as well as a plan for analysis 
including a calendar in which these tasks were accomplished.
The literature review provided information relating to the general 
background and context of the research. It focused on key issues in labour 
administration in China, general factors influencing street-level bureaucrats, 
specific Chinese factors of concern in labour policy enforcement, and debates 
on international labour standards and economic globalization. From this 
review as a jumping off point, I will now, in this section, try to focus and state 
the overall research question of interest to this study.
The growing commitment to improve OSH in China has been only 
accelerated by the increasing public attention to worker safety and health 
issues domestically and internationally. The ILO Country Office for China has 
worked in close collaboration with the Chinese government to improve OSH 
policy in conjunction with global standards and with workers’ and employers’ 
organizations to promote decent work for all in China.
Despite these efforts and changes, the Chinese case still reveals a glaring 
contradiction between theory and reality. China is frequently criticized for its 
labour abuses, epitomized by the sweatshop staffed by suffering migrant 
workers toiling for low wages. China has, however, a relatively comprehensive 
and rationalized and logically ordered framework of labour administration and 
regulation. The problem China faces is the problem of enforcing the law on 
the books or, as the ILO supervisory bodies advise, in practice on the ground. 
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A fundamental area for study in Chinese labour scholarship is, therefore, the 
workings of the street-level bureaucracy in labour administration and 
regulation. The important issue to discover and understand is what is 
happening on the ground where labour standards are to be enforced? What 
challenges or obstacles exist?
Labour inspectors are one typical example of street-level bureaucrats. 
They “interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs” and “have 
substantial discretion in the execution of their work” (Lipsky 1980). Local 
governments above the level of the district or county, even though they are 
generalists as government administrators, are responsible for the 
implementation and the administration of work safety and occupational health 
inspection (Production Safety Laws, Article 9). At the district or county levels, 
inspectors usually inspect both safety and health regulations, responsibilities 
that would seemingly only increase their discretion as inspectors. At the 
municipal level, joint inspection teams are the exception (Arrigo et al. 2011).
The review of literature focused on a recurring theme that emphasized the 
importance of studying the logic of street-level bureaucracy in the context of 
the enforcement of occupational safety and health in China. This research 
project therefore seeks to investigate the role of street-level bureaucrats within 
the Chinese system of labour inspection. It focuses as a result on the question 
of their discretion, asking, “What is the nature and latitude of labour inspector 
discretion in China?” This is the basic question this project seeks to explore.
3.2 Methodological approach
The philosophy underlying my research comes from the interpretive 
tradition but it does not completely abandon a positivist understanding of 
knowledge. The interpretive tradition often implies incorrectly a subjective 
epistemology and the belief that reality is socially constructed where the 
researcher explores only the understandings between subjective expressions 
of reality. Conducting cross-cultural and international research does require 
being open to different interpretations of knowledge and experience. Valuing 
an interpretive approach helps to bridge the cross-cultural divide and protects 
against the researcher projecting their own elite values upon that which is 
observed in the field. This sensitive approach makes the study more valuable 
as it gives recognition to the lived experience of the people and institutional 
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practices being observed and studied. Taking this approach makes the overall 
project more valid from a positivist viewpoint and does not necessarily mean 
abandoning entirely the idea of shared knowledge.
Social science research is often classified as positivist, interpretive or 
critical. These three perspectives are the popular paradigms in contemporary 
social, organizational, and management research. Positivism sees 
observation and reason as the best means of understanding human 
behaviour. “True knowledge is based on the experience of the senses and 
can be obtained by observation and experiment” (Thomas 2010). Positivists 
assume that “the reality is objectively given and is measurable using 
properties which are independent of the researcher and his or her 
instruments. Knowledge is objective and quantifiable” (Thomas 2010). 
This strict understanding of positivism has been critiqued because 
studying society and social life is considered to be different from studying 
chemicals in a laboratory. It is more complex, needing nuanced interpretation. 
For example, “social research is imbued with values, personal 
experiences, history and politics that cannot be separated from the data that 
the research produces” (Hughes, 2013). In addition, there are many questions 
raised about the nature of each observer’s social reality, and some 
interpretivists would even go so far as to say that there is not a single social 
reality that we can objectively know. The world in this constructivist view is 
only one subjective experience after another.
Post-positivist critics try to reconcile these approaches. Taking a post-
positivist approach shares the interpretivist view that social context and 
representation matters, but it does not sacrifice objectivism entirely even as it 
sees a degree of socially constructed reality. Critical researchers similarly 
recognize various forms of social, cultural and political domination. They 
attempt to question the taken-for-granted beliefs, values and social structures 
in society by making social structures and the problems that they produce 
visible, encouraging a self-conscious criticism by the researcher if not the 
subjects themselves. 
A post-positivist interpretivist paradigm stresses the need to put the 
analysis in context (Thomas 2010). “The interpretive paradigm is concerned 
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with understanding the world as it is from subjective experiences of 
individuals. They use meaning-oriented methodologies, such as narrative 
interviews” (Thomas 2010) so the research tools are capable of capturing 
these different understandings and do not serve to silence them. This can be 
done without sacrificing the notion of an objective reality because the study is 
defined as focused on the social reality of the people, institutions, systems, or 
social processes being studied. As one author has clearly described:
Interpretivists are concerned with understanding the social world 
people have produced and which they reproduce through their 
continuing activities. This everyday reality consists of the meanings and 
interpretations given by the social actors to their actions, other people’s 
actions, social situations, and natural and humanly created objects. In 
short, in order to negotiate their way around their world and make 
sense of it, social actors have to interpret their activities together, and it 
is these meanings, embedded in language, that constitute their social 
reality (Mason 2002).
Researchers can, however, take a more interpretive approach without 
abandoning traditional notions of objectivity in social research. This post-
positivist definition of an interpretivist view is simply more attuned to the reality 
of a social experience, without sacrificing the view of objective knowledge.
Creswell (1998) argues such an approach normally translates into 
gathering “deep” information and perceptions through inductive 
qualitative methods such as interviews and observation (Thomas 
2010).
This project is situated in the interpretivist post-positivist paradigm. The key to 
this methodology is collaboration and engagement with the subjects of study, 
and trying as a social researcher to be open to different interpretations of 
reality and knowledge. In this approach the researcher does not stand above 
or outside the subject, but actively engages and by so doing tries to discern 
the meaning of actions as they are expressed within specific social contexts.
3.3 Conceptual framework and research methods
In this section, this more contextualized conceptual model is defined for 
the Chinese context of labour and employment relations and labour 
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inspection. As described above, is a more integrative model that focuses on 
the factors influencing labour inspector discretion. It is followed by a series of 
working hypotheses that are formulated in line with the overall research 
objectives. First, however, I will state the specific research methods the 
project will use.
The main aim of this research is to explore the nature and latitude of 
labour inspector’s discretion in China. This theme is engendered by an 
increasing public attention to labour protection and regular reports of horrific 
cases of occupational safety and health problems in China. China appears to 
have built up a relatively comprehensive labour regulation system but the 
serious problem appears to be implementation of law on the ground. The 
obstacles to effective enforcement include the inability of the labour inspector 
to do their job due to various factors that limit or otherwise shape their 
discretion in opposing ways. In this conceptual model, labour inspection is 
street-level bureaucracy work. Labour inspectors supervise, investigate and 
punish private companies and employers on behalf of the state through the 
enforcement of the law (Liu 2006). Where their discretion to accomplish this 
task is challenged, so to may be the law. Conversely, discretion may serve to 
limit the effectiveness of law enforcement as inspectors are, for example, 
swayed by local power relationships and in turn elect not to cite violations. 
Getting a grasp of the dynamics of discretion is thus a primary aim and focus.
Research methods
This study is a qualitative case study. The unit of analysis is the discretion 
of the labour inspector to enforce OSH-related labour standards in China. The 
research design is a single case research design. The study will focus on the 
experience of labour inspectors in one district bureau in China where research 
access has been granted. Given the relevance of this single case to the 
overall research framework, namely China and the study of OSH labour 
standards enforcement, the value of the single case comes from the case 
being embedded in this context (Yin 2002). This approach offers value to the 
overall research project, yet holds validity issues that accompany any case 
study research design, especially an embedded single case study. These 
limitations are addressed below in the section on validity and reliability 
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Stake (2005: 445) makes a distinction between an intrinsic case study and 
an instrumental case study. In an intrinsic case study, a single case is 
selected because it alone has an important value given the unique position of 
the case within a social setting. An instrumental case study, conversely, 
represents an important body of cases that are of interest to a researcher. In 
the instrumental approach, a single case may be selected for study if it 
provides insight into a particularly important issue and shares similarities with 
other cases of interest. This case study is an instrumental case study to the 
degree that any findings can be generalized to other district-level labour 
inspection services in China. 
Little to none empirical research has been made on Chinese street-level 
bureaucracy related to OSH labour inspection. Labour protection is a huge 
and complex issue in such a large country with 1.3 billion people. The level of 
economic development, the population, and policy all influence what effect 
labour inspection may have. With these confounding external factors, studies 
that are readily and reliably generalizable are difficult. Research approaches 
that embrace complexity by using open-ended interview strategies can, in this 
environment, develop helpful case studies on work safety administration. 
The primary data source for my research is a small sample of semi-
structured interviews (12) with front-line labour inspectors implementing 
Chinese safety and health law. This allows for carefully prepared questions 
that ensure that all the areas of interest are covered, and nothing is left out. 
Furthermore, it is open and allows the interviewer to deviate and probe further 
on issues of interest that arise. This allows for more detailed information to be 
obtained as interviewee’s responses can be expanded and explained, adding 
context, validity and particularities based on their own lived experience. 
“Semi-structured interviews involve a pre-existing set of questions, but 
allow the interviewer the flexibility to deviate and probe further if the need 
arises” (Phakisi 2008). Using a qualitative approach implies, to some extent, 
the use of a semi- or unstructured interview schedule, as opposed to a 
structured interview questionnaire that can often just resemble a survey. 
Semi- or unstructured interviews are more flexible and can be compared to 
conversations in style. Semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to 
explore issues as they arise, whilst providing an initial framework for areas for 
discussion. They also facilitate an immediate response to a question, allow 
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both parties to explore the meaning of the questions and answers and resolve 
any ambiguities and can provide a friendly emphasis to data collection. In 
addition, they encourage the participant to tell their story in their own words. 
Semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate method for data 
collection for my research project. One reason is the depth of information that 
can be provided during an interview. The first sub-questions thus focused on 
the implementation and application of relevant OSH law in China. It is very 
difficult to explore such an issue in this broad context. In the literature review 
chapter, I have explained that policy comes alive in the daily practice of street-
level bureaucrats. The reality is far more complex than legislators imagine. 
Thus, this strategy allows me the opportunity to try to capture the range of 
discretionary powers where street-level bureaucrats are policy makers. The 
public servant’s work experience is my main interest. 
As the interviewer, I guided each interview using primarily open-ended 
questions that encouraged the participant to discuss their experience. A list of 
questions was developed in advance to explore the issue of discretion of the 
inspectors and any influence on the implementation and application of relative 
work safety laws. Furthermore, the questions (See Appendix) attempted to 
find out the obstacles and problems in legal implementation. Relevant data 
were also obtained in examining key documents and joining a team of labour 
inspectors on-the-job for a very brief time to help me understand their work.
As inspectors from different departments often face different problems, 
the semi-structured interview is open to allow them to tell their own story and 
allowed for a degree of rapport to develop with each inspector, thus facilitating 
a deep degree of providing information of relevance to this research project.
Field notes were taken throughout the research process. Field notes were 
additional opportunities to collect data during the semi-structured interviews. I 
took notes during each of the inspector interviews and then expanded on 
them after personal reflection. This provided an opportunity to record and 
comment on my thoughts about the setting, the respondents and activities. 
Such data contributes to further steps in subsequent field work and issues 
relevant during the analysis phase (Sooful, et al. 2009). Fretz and Emerson 
(1995) indicate that a researcher can identify significant characteristics 
gleaned from her first impressions and personal reactions. Field notes helped 
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in this process. With participation in the local social world, she becomes more 
sensitive to the concerns and the perspectives of those people living and 
working within those local settings (Emerson and Emerson 1995).
Document collection also provided another source of data. In addition to 
semi-structured interviews and field notes, information was gathered through 
documentary evidence. I read the news, visited official websites, and reviewed 
publically available internal government documents related to the processes 
and procedures of OSH labour inspection. This information helped to create a 
better understanding of the work safety administration. Sufficient information 
was gathered through these sources that facilitated a degree of description, 
background and function, although limitations in data collection did exist, such 
as only being able to interview a limited number of labour inspectors (12).
Sample selection rationale
The case that was selected is one typical district bureau of work safety in 
the Beijing region. The selection of this case was mainly based on two issues. 
The first is the important position of the Beijing region overall. Beijing is indeed 
a major political, economic, educational and cultural center of China and is 
thus intrinsically an important location. Multinational corporations, private 
enterprises, and state owned enterprises are all active components and 
objects of inspection in the Beijing area.  What is more, a group of labour 
inspectors directly engaged in OSH inspection there agreed to be interviewed. 
The second reason for this particular case study selection was a matter of 
access and convenience. Research access was obtained through my family 
relations (my father had worked in a related governmental institution for many 
years). He arranged my introduction to officials working in the administration 
of work safety and through this personal relationship I was in response offered 
an opportunity to access the labour inspectors in one local office very easily. 
Likewise, my own history gave me a unique insight into the context of the area 
and the locality as I was familiar with the history, culture and policy of the area 
and this informed and shaped my questions during the interviews.
Random sampling is generally considered desirable, as all members of 
the population will have the same chance of being selected, so results are 
less likely to be biased and can be more easily generalized to the larger 
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population of individuals of interest (Phakisi 2008). Conversely, theoretical 
sampling means selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of issues 
relevant to your research, your theoretical position and most importantly the 
explanation or account which you are developing (Silverman 2005). 
Random sampling is not always feasible in social science, so an 
accessible group may be used – what researchers call “convenience 
sampling” (Phakisi 2008). Convenience sampling is seldom feasible to get 
access to the theoretically ideal sample, so researchers “often need to select 
a convenience sample or face the possibility that they will be unable to do the 
study” (Phakisi 2008). Convenience sampling and theoretical sampling ideas 
and strategies thus form the basis of my study and are used in this study in 
order to justify my selection of this work safety administration case in China. 
A problem, however, is that such samples are often biased, as the group 
may have features that are not representative of the target population, like 
being more motivated or enthusiastic. Convenience sampling makes no claim 
that the sample is representative of the population, and thus has limitations in 
terms of generalization of the results from the sample to the population it 
represents (Phakisi 2008). These specific limitations will now be discussed.
Validity and reliability
Kirk and Miller (1986) have stated “social science is in every sense of the 
word fully as ‘scientific’ as physics and has fully as much need for reliability 
and validity as any other science” (Niekerk 2009). Validity is said to be more 
important than reliability, yet a harder concern to evaluate (Niekerk 2009). 
Validity is the extent to which it gives the correct answer (Niekerk 2009) 
and is another word for truth (Silverman 2005). Kirk and Miller (1986) indicate 
field research is a kind of validity check (Niekerk 2009). I conducted my 
research within an administration of work safety, and I interview public 
servants working there, thus, promoting a degree of validity in my research. 
Construct validity is the establishment of correct operation measures for 
the concepts being studied. Multiple sources of evidence were used in order 
to ensure construct validity. Evidence came from a collection of semi-
structured narrative interviews with labour inspectors, field notes written from 
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visiting the inspection bureau, and the use of document-based evidence such 
as publically available legislative records and an important inspection manual. 
Internal validity is the ability to identify and rule out any spurious relations 
between concepts within your study. To ensure internal validity, I considered 
rival explanations for phenomena across the experience of labour inspectors 
and asked labour inspectors to explain their claims in detail when something 
was not clear. I wrote basic logic models in my field notes based on some 
particular phenomena of interest and followed-up with respondents by email 
and telephone to determine if I understood what had been described in a clear 
way. As a result, my data and description of the evidence did happen in depth.
External validity is generalizability. Given that this is a single case study 
research design with instrumental value with a small number of interviews, I 
argue for any degree of generalizability of my research findings with great 
caution. This study is limited in its generalizability claims as is typical with 
many qualitative case study research designs. Nevertheless, I strive to try to 
elaborate key social processes that might on their own be generalizable. 
Reliability is a demonstration that your research procedures can be 
repeated again in a similar context. I used basic case study protocols related 
to data collection and management for semi-structured narrative interviews so 
as to allow this study to be repeated again in similar settings if needed. This 
included following an interview questionnaire tool (see Appendix), the 
systematic chronological management of field notes, organized document 
management, and basic coding of various themes, issues, ideas, concerns 
and obstacles discovered upon examination of all of my document evidence.  
Conceptual framework
The general research question asks, “What is the nature and latitude of a 
Chinese labour inspector’s discretion in the administration of work safety?” 
Sub-questions follow this. What are the factors that will influence labour 
inspector’s discretion? What difficulties, challenges and problems do street 
level public servants meet when enforcing the law of work safety and health?
The table below presents the conceptual framework of this research. In 
this model, the factors influencing labour inspector discretion have been 
operationalized in five specific areas: material resources, human resource 
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management, workforce characteristics, administrative and legal lacunae, and 
other factors not considered. These basic variables have been adapted from 
Lipsky’s original study of street-level bureaucracy and developed for the 
Chinese context of enforcing labour standards under the ILO labour system.
TABLE 1. Conceptual framework
Independent variables Dependent variable
Material resources  >
Human resource management  >
Workforce characteristics  >
Administrative and legal lacunae  >
Other factors  >
Discretion of
Street-Level
Labour Inspectors
The dependent variable is defined as the discretion of street-level labour 
inspectors. This study assumes there is a complex relationship between the 
enforcement of labour standards and discretion on the part of street-level 
labour inspectors doing their job. This means that discretion may work to both 
enforce labour standards or conversely weaken labour standards. However, if 
we define discretion to mean anything that limits an inspector from doing his 
or her job to enforce labour standards, or allows the inspector to decide not to 
enforce labour standards, then this dependent variable is reasonable. 
3.4 Operationalization and specific indices
The model above provides a sensitizing framework for analyzing labour 
inspectors and labour standards enforcement in China. Each of these issues 
can be further specified as particular indices to help guide this study. It is 
important to note, however, that this research design is not exclusively a 
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variable-centered approach. The research model remains open in order to 
conform to the basic principles of a qualitative case study research design.
Material resources
The availability of material resources is one key factor that influences the 
labour inspector in enforcing labour standards. Material resources include the 
tools needed to perform the job, for instance, computers, printers, audio 
recorders, etc. Another indicator under this issue is the out-of-pocket 
expenses that labour inspectors have. It means how much money will be 
allocated to each labour inspector. Travel expenses are also important 
resources so an inspector can visit the factories they must inspect without 
assuming any personal financial costs. Material resources also include 
staffing levels like a labour inspection services average ratio of workers to 
labour inspector. This ratio in particular is identified as being important under 
international standards and the ILO actually maintains national level statistics 
to monitor respect for certain ratios. 
Human resource management
Human resource management policies of the labour inspection service 
itself can influence labour inspector discretion. Human resource management 
is the management of an administration work safety workforce, or human 
resources. It is responsibility for the attraction, selection, training, assessment, 
and rewarding of employees. In this issue, three indicators are often included. 
The first indicator is professional training. Training means to maintain and 
improve professional competence, to keep abreast of new technology and 
practice, or to comply with professional regulatory organizations such as 
trainings related to inspection procedures, accident investigation and case 
analysis. A second indicator is performance measurement, which is a process 
for collecting and reporting information regarding the performance of each 
labour inspector. The last indicator is the discipline and reward in an 
administration of work safety. The inspectors who are aware of their 
responsibilities and the consequences of not following them are more apt to 
perform at a higher standard.
Workforce characteristics
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China’s remarkable growth in recent years has set into motion far-
reaching socio-economic changes – the rapid transfer of the labour force from 
agricultural to non-agricultural work, diversifying forms of employment, the 
migration of high-hazard industries from urban and coastal to rural and inland 
areas. Each of these poses serious challenges to OSH inspectorates (Arrigo 
et al. 2011). This component includes non-voluntary clients. The clients of 
street-level bureaucracies are non-voluntary in a legal and structural sense. 
Another indicator is the use of migrant workers. They go to the urban cities in 
the eastern coastal areas from the western and central inlands of China. They 
are needed for economic growth but do not enjoy the rights of urban residents 
and are not sufficiently protected either in or outside of work. Dispatch worker 
use is another indicator here as this kind of worker is in more precarious state 
that regular employees not "dispatched" from other firms (Cooney 2006).
Administrative and legal lacunae
The administrative and legal lacunae are factors that were explored. The 
term lacuna refers to something that is missing or a gap or an unfilled space. 
The current laws and administrations of work safety have limitations. These 
limitations can be seen from the following indicators. The first is undefined 
regulations. China promulgated two important acts of legislation: the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Work Safety (29 June 2002) and the Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Occupational Diseases Prevention and 
Control (Arrigo et al. 2011). The second indicator is the unclear coverage. 
Here the lacuna of law is confusion of the objectives of an inspection. A final 
indicator here would be the weak enforcement powers. Sanctions that labour 
departments can deploy against egregious violators are actually quite weak.
Other factors
There were some factors that were not defined before this study began 
and needed to be explored in the process of research. These factors were 
added to allow for flexibility in my research model given that it is a case study. 
Other factors included the type of industry being inspected and important 
issues that were raised by the labour inspectors themselves. Staff quality was 
a factor I expected might be in this category, such as labour inspector 
educational background, work experience, etc. and the affect on discretion. 
The political relationship with the government was another factor considered 
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in this category. Local government considerations, financial and otherwise, 
were also considered as possibly determining how OHS laws were to be 
implemented, monitored, and enforced by the front-line labour inspectors. 
3.5 Working hypothesis
Hypotheses can be considered intelligent hunches, guesses, or 
predictions that help researchers seek a solution or answer a research 
question. “Hypotheses are vehicles for testing the validity of the theoretical 
framework assumptions and provide a bridge between theory (a set of 
interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions) and the real world” 
(LoBiondo-Wood and Haber 2010).
From prior studies, it was evident that the inadequate resources are one 
of the serious issues facing OSH inspection. According to a survey, China 
suffers from a severe shortage of trained labour inspectors. State 
Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) has approximately one officer for every 
35,000 workers (Tunon 2006). This study accordingly focused on whether this 
ratio has a direct impact on labour inspector power of discretion. At the same 
time, few research studies have focused on the tools and out of pocket 
expenses inspectors make performing the job. Thus it was hypothesized:
H1
Labour inspector discretion is affected because inspectors do not have 
adequate resources to do their job.
The number of rural migrants seeking employment in the country’s urban 
centers has risen from two million in the mid-1980s to as many as 150 million 
today (Tunon 2006). Migratory workers play a crucial role for economic 
development. However, they suffer as second-class citizens and endure work 
through informal employment without rights, social protection and access to 
social services. Such a huge population, their precarious state of employment 
and the frequently occurring work safety accident of migrant workers make 
labour inspectors’ job more complex. Therefore, it was hypothesized that:
H2
60
Labour inspector discretion is affected because the Chinese workforce is 
too migratory or precarious to assist inspectors in enforcing the law.
We have witnessed improvement in Chinese labour law on the books. 
However, street-level bureaucracy often feels there are no laws or regulations 
to fall back on in their work. In addition, the fact that the clarifying provisions 
are scattered through a range of legislative instruments, the status of which is 
not always apparent means that they are neither readily accessible by the 
employers who are supposed to comply with them, nor the employees whose 
interests they are intended to protect. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that:
H3
Labour inspector discretion is affected because of undeveloped or 
undefined law with weak sanctions.
A street-level bureaucracy’s performance measurements are often limited 
or non-existent because goals are ambiguous. What is the existing 
measurement of the administration of work safety, what is the reward and 
sanction system, and what is the influence of these human resource practices 
on inspector discretion this research is trying to address? Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that:
H4
Labour inspector discretion is affected because labour inspectors are too 
focused on narrow performance evaluation metrics. 
There are numerous factors that affect directly or indirectly labour 
inspector discretion. As noted above, China suffers from a severe shortage of 
trained labour inspectors. The result is that without a well-trained inspectorate 
to enforce the law, penalize non-compliance and promote the importance of 
safe working environments, employers will continue to violate the law (Tunon 
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2006). Furthermore, municipal authorities may maintain arbitrary, 
discriminatory and protectionist labour policies leading to an absence of rigor 
and a failure of their implementation (Tunon 2006). This lead to the following 
hypothesis that:
H5
Labour inspector discretion is affected because of other factors not 
considered previously.
These five working hypothesis were used as general guides for directing 
my questions in the semi-structured interviews. They each were also open 
enough to allow for me to capture the real-world experience of the street-level 
OSH labour inspector in China as they understood and shared their views.
3.6 Observation and data collection plan
Over the past twenty years, “the world has been awestruck by China’s 
breakneck pace of industrial development” (Chen 2010). However, China is 
usually criticized for unsafe working conditions and occupational diseases. To 
strengthen the uniform leadership and management of work safety nationwide 
and to promote the steady improvement of good working conditions, the 
government has made wide efforts. One significant effort was ratification of 
Convention No. 155 in 2007 and in response implementation of the National 
Work Safety Programme (2006 - 2010) including the National Programme for 
Occupational Diseases Prevention and Control (2009 - 2015) (Arrigo et al. 
2011). The State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) is responsible for 
overall supervision, administration, direction and coordination of work safety 
and since 2008 is also responsible for workplace health inspection across the 
country. It exercises the supervision and inspection of this administration by 
other relevant national authorities and local (provincial, municipal and 
district/county) governments (Arrigo et al. 2011). The governments above the 
level of district/county are responsible for the implementation and 
administration of workplace safety and occupational health inspection. Labour 
inspectors supervise and inspect safety regulations at the workplace level. 
Site access and observation plan
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This project examined one district-level office of the State Administration 
of Work Safety (SAWS) in the Beijing area. The officials participating in my 
study were from different departments in this administration of work safety, 
which included the minister of the local district of work safety administration, 
officials from the general office, the department of supervision and 
administration, the department of comprehensive coordination, and other 
labour inspectors from the front line of safety law enforcement and inspection 
department. My priority was to interview the front-line labour inspectors. 
The major responsibilities of this administration of work safety is to 
implement the national and municipal work safety policies, laws and 
regulations, organize the drafting of relevant local laws and regulations, 
develop safety policy and planning, guide coordination of municipal work 
safety, analyze and forecast the work safety situation in the district, publish 
municipal work safety information, and coordinate significant problems of work 
safety. It is also responsible for undertaking the responsibility of municipal 
government work safety integrated supervision, guide coordination, supervise 
and inspect municipal government departments and prefecture-level and 
above safety work. They also have a role in major accident investigation and 
supervision and inspection of the workplace occupational health of mining 
firms and safety permit management. 
I focused on three important departments in this district-level 
administration, the Department of Comprehensive Coordination (综合协调科), 
the Department of Organizational Personnel (人事科), and the Department of 
Safety Law Enforcement and Inspection (安全执法监察队).
The Department of Comprehensive Coordination
The major responsibilities here are analyzing and reporting the work 
safety situation in the city periodically and providing advice and suggestions 
on the implementation of work safety. This department also proposes advice 
for work safety development, organizes work safety inspection and special 
inspections, and releases work safety reports. This department has been 
chosen because this department provides rich information about the general 
OSH situation and background about labour inspection within this district. 
Thus, it helps me to answer the research questions regarding labour 
inspection and give context. 
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The Department of Organization Personnel
The major responsibilities of this department are staffing, personnel 
deployment, the labour and wages system, the positional titles management, 
the cadre training, the political records examination, the management of cadre 
files and retired cadres within the administration. This department essentially 
performs the human resource management functions. It also recommends, 
discusses, elects and honours the exemplar employees of all kind. As one 
issue of concern is human resources management, this department is 
relevant.
The Department of Safety Law Enforcement and Inspection
This department is responsible for administering comprehensively the 
work of safe production within this local district, exercising administrative 
enforcement of law against acts violating laws, rules and regulations on safe 
production, etc. This department of safety law enforcement and inspection is 
responsible for all street-level labour inspectors and they were the main 
respondents for this study. 
The interviews were divided into two sections. The first part focused on 
general information about the labour inspector in their district. This included 
their major responsibilities, coverage rates of the inspector, the requirements 
and duties and challenges of being a labour inspector, training, performance 
measurement and the equipment of a labour inspector and related questions. 
The second part of the interview focused on the real experience and 
latitude of the labour inspector. Questions here were more open-ended and 
related to the procedures of inspection, the sanctions for violations of laws, 
difficulties, challenges and problems, and special protections to migrant 
workers, etc. 
Before each of the interviews, the presentation of the consent letter to the 
participants took place. This letter clarified that the study was connected to my 
personal research work as a M.Sc. student at my university. This is helpful 
because I did not want the participants to perceive the interview as being any 
kind of evaluation of their work. It was necessary to build trust between the 
participant and myself. I also told them that the consent form is a procedural 
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matter that is more of an obligatory and legal bureaucratic requirement than a 
symbol of any personal power and authority. 
The duration of the interviews was between 30 to 60 minutes. I followed 
my questionnaire tool and wrote notes during the entire interview and later 
open coded my notes as indicated in the research methods section above.
The interviews were conducted in Chinese only. The data was analyzed 
carefully through iterative and a repeated reading of them. As a result, it was 
possible for me to gain an increasingly profound understanding of the links 
and contradictions within different interviews, of each interviewee’s point of 
view and perspective, of the complex factors emerging from the interviews 
and of the numerous relationships between the concepts relevant to my study.
Furthermore, according to the nature of the semi-structured interview, 
some preliminary analysis was conducted after each interview. The purpose 
of such analysis is to identify themes and topics not listed in the set of 
questions but brought up in conversation by the respondents themselves. As 
a result, if new items or concepts were found, I add new questions in order to 
explore these topics with later participants. Moreover, the participants did not 
answer the questions in sequence. If an idea was of interest to the 
respondent, I skipped around and explored it with them. After that, I returned 
to question in the list, and asked them. The process remained in a state of 
refinement.
Confidentially and privacy concerns
Each inspector asked to participate in an interview is an official public 
servant and a professional in their field of employment. Their participation was 
voluntary and they were allowed to end the interview at any time they wish. 
The participants were informed that they could refuse to answer any 
questions. 
Following best practices in research methods, I protected the identity of 
each participant by making their contribution protected as confidential. Files of 
each interview were and will be in my possession at all times and will never be 
shared in any form. When the documents were analyzed answers from 
individual respondents are anonymized here using writing strategies that hide 
the identity of the contributor. Furthermore, an added layer of precaution exist 
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because I do not name the specific administrative region office. These are 
basic steps taken in qualitative case study research and not actions that I am 
taking because these professional individuals are in any vulnerable position.
3.7 Data analysis plan
Data analysis is a pervasive activity throughout the life of a research 
project (Silverman 2005). Merriam states that data analysis is the “process of 
making sense and meaning from the data that constitute the finding of the 
study’’ (Niekerk 2009). Data analysis begins with the categorization and 
organization of data in search of patterns, critical themes and meanings that 
emerge from the data (Thomas 2010). This process sometimes refers to 
coding the data. 
After all interviews were documented and re-read, I examine all of the 
evidence for unique issues and common themes. Coded notes were marked 
with key concepts as discussed in the working hypothesis section. These key 
ideas form the basis for coding within the qualitative software QDA Miner. In 
order to analyze the data within QDA Miner, I imported them into QDA Miner. 
As some initial key themes or concepts have been created, they become the 
primary data to be analyzed to explain the discretion of street-level inspectors. 
Field notes from my interviews were an important source of information, 
but a case study privileges a diversity of evidence and information. My coding 
extended to other field notes as well as any documentary evidence I collected 
over the course of my research. Since I participated with the work of a labour 
inspection team on-site, notes from this experience were also important. The 
data analysis happened in an iterative process and happened between and 
after each interview was finished. Field notes were processed after each 
interview. They were marked with a number. For example, the first day, after 
the first interview, I marked a ‘’1’’ on the top right of the page and included the 
date and location, and who I interviewed according to a number I assigned 
them. I wrote up notes regarding my impressions of each respondent and how 
each interview went and added them to my field notes, including any 
reflections or thoughts that were fresh in my mind shortly after each interview. 
Documentary evidence collected like material produced, administrative 
manuals, etc. were dated and coded according to content and relevance. 
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My focus in data analysis was to identify any common themes, shared 
experiences, notable problems and unique issues. The goal of the analysis 
was to review the evidence, be sensitive to context and background 
information that might help explain the phenomena and answer my research 
questions about discretion. I classified my findings to help me reflect on the 
most important areas in terms of clarity that helped answer my hypotheses 
and then reported on the most interesting and valuable aspects discovered.
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Chapter 4
Data Analysis: 
On-the-job with a front-line labour inspection team
4.1 Background of the entities being inspected
According to my plan outlined in the previous chapter, I returned to China 
and began my fieldwork and document collection in early 2013. On April 4th, 
2013, I was given an opportunity to follow a small group of labour inspectors 
to complete their field labour inspection work. In the afternoon of April the 3rd, 
one of the labour inspectors telephoned and told me some information about 
this scheduled field inspection work. The object of the inspection the next day 
was Beijing X Plaza (a fictitious name) and I would join the labour inspection 
team on their inspection of this site. The management was informed before 
the inspection. The start time was ten o’clock in the morning and the duration 
of the visit was to be about one hour or so (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013). 
After hanging up the phone, I began to browse the internet for the website 
of the establishment and search for some relevant information. The object of 
the labour inspection visit related largely to the dangers posed by the issue of 
large assembly occupancies. Furthermore, the International Labour Day and 
its associated celebrations were drawing near, meaning various performances 
were scheduled to increase as a result. For these reasons, this worksite was 
identified as one of the key inspection objects (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 
2013). In keeping with my research obligations to anonymize case study data, 
I refrain from a more complete description of the site beyond this description.
In the possession of the general information above, I also researched an 
important document for the labour inspectors, the Work Safety Enforcement 
and Inspection Guide. I learned this official procedures manual was used by 
all of the SAWS labour inspectors in their day-to-day work. It outlined key 
rules to follow and decision-making labour inspectors were to follow. Chapter 
Seven of this manual presented the details of inspection work for the safety 
regulation of large assemblies and occupancy regulations. The book defined 
the term "assembly occupancy" as a place where there is a high concentration 
of people, and likely to cause numerous casualties if a hazardous event was 
to occur, such as hotels and restaurants, production and processing workshop 
68
of labour-intensive enterprises, etc. (Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection 
Guide 2006). The inspection contents and methods of this Chapter Seven 
included eight sections, outlined below in Table 4.1. The inspection contents 
above were designed to address hazards that were likely to cause hazard 
events or other unsafe factors from occurring in a setting similar to the target 
worksite. In addition to trying to find information about the establishment 
online and reading the Enforcement and Inspection Guide, I acquainted 
myself with the regulations outlined in this section of this Inspection Guide the 
night before I was scheduled to join the local SAWS labour inspection team. 
Table 4.1. Excerpted from Chapter Seven of the Inspection Manuel 
(SAWS Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006: 99)
Inspection projects and contents for assembly occupancies
Inspection project Contents
Work Safety Management
Staffing, management system code, 
contingency plans, work safety education and 
training, special operations personnel 
management system, secure protocol
Evacuation Security Evacuation passageway, safety exit, emergency lighting, evacuation plans.
Safety signs
Emergency exit signs, evacuation signs, 
indication signs, prohibitory signage, sign 
setting requirements.
Fire protection Fire control room, fire-fighting equipment, emergency broadcast, alarm equipment.
Power Distribution Room
Electrician, management system, operating 
tools and labour protection appliance, other 
facilities, prohibitions.
Electrical Wiring Safety Operating procedures, line laying, device detects
Equipment Safety Gas and stove, other equipment and facilities.
Warehouse Item stacked, firefighting, electrical wiring, prohibitions.
Special Equipment Safety Registration, device detection, technical information, daily inspection.
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4.2 On the job with a front-line labour inspection team
The next day, I met the labour inspection team and joined them as they 
started their field inspection work. I met the group of the front line labour 
inspectors at 10 o’clock in the morning at the front gate of the facility. This 
group consisted of three people: A male I will call Mr. Z who was in his early 
thirties and who was the team leader and who had telephoned me the day 
before. There was also a female labour inspector, about 27 or 28 years old as 
well as another male who was more than thirty years old. Both of them were 
front line labour inspectors employed by the State Administration of Work 
Safety who each had field inspection work being part of their daily routine 
work duties. Each inspector was wearing a similar dark blue official-looking 
uniform with the exclusive logo of the State Administration of Work Safety. 
They looked like police officers. One had a camera and carried documents. 
After introductions to each other among us, the labour inspection team began 
work (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013).  
As mentioned to me the night before on the telephone, the management 
of the facility was expecting us. This was not an unannounced SAWS labour 
inspection visit. Labour inspectors under international labour standards are to 
be empowered to make unannounced labour inspections if needed, so this 
was the first notable observation from my participation in the labour 
inspection.
The security department manager was the first to receive us in the main 
hall of the Beijing X Plaza. This was the first employee we encountered, and 
he was expecting us. We all then moved to be seated in the coffee shop in the 
corner of this receiving hall. We had a brief self-introduction, after that Mr. Z, 
the inspection team leader, described the purpose and the main contents of 
what would happen during the course of this safety inspection.
 The first part of the inspection focused on the issue of the work safety 
management system. The team leader Mr. Z first asked if the establishment 
had a safety management department and asked if they had full-time or part-
time safety management personnel. The management official answered these 
questions and described in detail the Beijing X Plaza safety management 
system. He said that the security department was responsible for work safety 
and health and described the personnel (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013).
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After our introductory meeting in the cafe, the manager was required to 
show the labour inspection team all of the management system codes and 
contingency plans. Since all these files were saved in the Records Office, the 
manager designated one of his staff members to pick them up so that he 
could stay with the labour inspection team. Meanwhile, our team leader Mr. Z 
started to raise specific questions regarding the work safety education and 
training program, the special operations personnel management system, and 
the security protocols. Among the questions Mr. Z asked were as follows: 
“Have you conducted regularly OSH training for all employees and have 
they passed the assessment of training?” 
“Have you conducted OSH training on all new employees before 
beginning work and have they passed the assessment of training?” 
“Has the content of the training been recorded?” 
“As for the special operations personnel operating the management 
system, do they hold relevant certificates?” 
“To protect the safety of every employee, have you ever signed a secure 
protocol when your corporation and other work units take production 
activities in the same work area where it might may endanger others?” 
(Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013) 
The safety manager replied that each employee had been trained and that 
they should have passed the assessment before beginning work. He also 
mentioned that all training content, personnel, dates, and locations have been 
recorded. He also said that all of the special operations personnel, for 
example, the electrician, had been recruited legally and formally. Furthermore, 
all secure protocols were saved and could be viewed by the labour inspection 
team at any time (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013).
When waiting for the management system code and contingency plans, 
Mr. Z suggested that one labour inspector continue to wait and check the 
documents when they arrived, at the same time he and the other labour 
inspector in the team went to another location of interest: The Central Control 
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Room for the entire facility. I followed the team leader Mr. Z and the other 
inspector into the Central Control Room (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).
On the way to our next location, Mr. Z explained to me the importance of 
the Central Control Room in this type of facility. For this kind of a large-scale 
enterprise with both employees and customers frequently in the same space, 
the Central Control Room was usually equipped with multiple electronic 
displays and control panels to safeguard all employees and the public within 
the enterprise. Especially in the case of fire or other emergencies, the Central 
Control Room could play a significant role (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013).   
The Central Control Room was located in the basement of the facility. 
There were two employees on duty in the room and both were awaiting us in 
in front of the control panels as they received us upon our arrival. The labour 
inspectors noted fire extinguishing equipment and fire protection placed near 
the Central Control Room door. Each of us was required to complete a visitor 
registration before we entered the room (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). 
When I entered, I found that there was a large wall-sized display area 
visible from all locations within the space (see Photo 1). The Central Control 
Room was itself under continuous video surveillance and recording, for the 
reasons of, I was told, both safety precautions and personnel accountability 
purposes (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). 
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Photo 1
We visited the 
Central Control 
Room of the facility 
and the head of our 
labour inspection 
team informed me of 
the importance of 
this room for this 
type of facility which 
has mixed use of 
employees and the 
general public. 
To ensure all the workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes 
under their control are safe, the inspection subject focused a significant 
amount of time on the Central Control Room which included a mix of issues. 
Someone was required to be on duty all 24 hours of each day (Work Safety 
Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006: 102). The Central Control Room 
was required to be equipped with emergency kits and other equipment. There 
should be a duty record which was to include alarm condition and equipment 
operation. There should be bilingual emergency broadcast or recording tape 
that could facilitate emergency evacuation. The employees were required to 
grasp the corresponding emergency treatment, and know how to use the 
equipment in the Central Control Room. The employees should make sure all 
the equipment is operating properly (Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection 
Guide 2006: 102). The two labour inspectors then checked if all the electronic 
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displays and control panels worked properly, and they also viewed the duty 
records that were available in the room.
After that, the two labour inspectors then turned their focus to the fire 
fighting equipment and checked the equipment (see Photo 2). They asked 
employees from the Central Control Room to allocate and purchase specific 
fire control facilities and devices, instructed them to set up fire control safety 
marks in accordance with relevant state regulations, and organize regular 
inspection and maintenance in-house to ensure their perfect condition and 
effective maintenance of the fire control facilities and devices. They were also 
informed that the quality of the fire control products must conform to the state 
standards or industrial standards (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013). It was not 
clear to me if the inspectors had found specific defects in the management of 
the facility related to these items, but what was happening was a significant 
amount of education of the local management employees versus anything that 
resembled a strong-arm enforcement strategy with threat of being cited.
Photo 2
The two other labour inspectors 
on the team turned their focus on 
checking if the fire equipment was 
functioning and if the proper 
documentary records were in 
order before giving some 
instruction to the managerial staff 
on the various fire safety 
requirements.
The manager then told us that the plaza had formulated a fire control 
safety system and operation rules on fire control safety. They had exercised a 
fire prevention safety responsibility system, appointed a person-in-charge for 
fire control safety of the unit and various departments and posts under the 
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unit. Furthermore, they conducted fire control communication and education 
on the employees in light of the characteristics of the unit and organized fire 
prevention inspection and removed hidden dangers over time. These actions 
were highly commended by the inspection team leader, Mr. Z. He concluded 
that both the Central Control Room and the related fire-fighting equipment 
were both fairly complete and adequate (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).
Leaving the Central Control Room, the manager then led our group to the 
next place to be inspected, the Power Distribution Room. The Power 
Distribution Room was in another building, away from the main building.
When our SAWS inspection team and accompanying management safety 
director walked to the Power Distribution Room, the employee on duty there 
was waiting and ready and expecting to received us. Similar to the Central 
Control Room, each member of our group was required to complete a visitor 
registration before we entered (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).
The Power Distribution Room is a space dedicated to the electrical 
equipment. The Power Distribution Room of the facility has a Main Electrical 
Room and Subsidiary Electrical Rooms. The electrician on duty is responsible 
for the daily maintenance of the two rooms of the Power Distribution Room(s). 
As a result, the inspection focused on two issues in this particular location, the 
equipment / facilities inspection, and the operating tools / personal protection 
equipment of the electricians working there (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). 
According to the Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide that I 
had reviewed before the visit, the equipment / facilities inspection included an 
inspection of an electrical equipment planar map – a flat-screen map of power 
distribution across the facility, duty records, the installation of the emergency 
lighting system, and a special fire extinguisher (Work Safety Enforcement and 
Inspection Guide 2006). After twenty minutes of checking inside the Power 
Distribution Room, our team leader Mr. Z believed that all equipment and 
facilities conformed to either the legal and regulatory standards or industry 
standards. He also found that the evacuation passageway and safety exit 
were unblocked and that evacuation marks had been set up on fire control 
safety conforming to the state regulations (Fieldnotes, X Plaza, April 4 2013).
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As for the protection of the electrician's work safety, the state stipulates 
that all electricians must hold relevant certificates and make duty records 
(Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006). They are required to 
wear protective equipment. This protective equipment must conform to the 
state standards or the industry standard, and must be checked regularly. 
The employee on duty told us that there were eleven electricians in total 
employed by the facility. Each of them held electrician licenses. Each of these 
licenses were kept on file by the company, not on the person of the individual 
electrician, in violation of the regulation. They also reported they maintained a 
good record on working shifts. Mr. Z agreed with those measures, but he also 
pointed out that according to the law, electricians must have the electrician 
license on their person at all work times. This was one violation of the law that 
was identified during our visit. Mr. Z asked the manager for a correction, but 
he did not record this violation since he did not consider that it was serious 
enough to warrant a legal citation (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). 
Next, we checked the protective equipment of the electrician that included 
the electrician’s insulated boots, gloves and safety helmets. Mr. Z said the 
quality of this equipment conformed to either the state legal standards or the 
industry standards (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). The reference to both 
the government legal standards and industry standards during the inspection 
had happened more than once. I noted this observation for later reflection.
Finally, Mr. Z checked the fire control facilities and devices. The employee 
on duty said that the company organized regular inspection and maintenance 
to ensure effective condition of fire control facilities and devices. Mr. Z was 
very satisfied with the inspection of the Power Distribution Room.
We left the Power Distribution Room and returned to the main building. 
The last inspection location on this visit was a large gathering facility where 
large public crowds would gather. Two of the people responsible for this area 
met us at the front gate. This area was not open to the public because there 
were professional actors and actresses rehearsing inside. Mr. Z described the 
purpose of this visit to the people at the gate and the aims and objectives of 
the inspection to the persons in charge. After that, they gave us permission 
and we were allowed to enter the area (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).
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This part of the facility was one typical example of a large assembly and 
occupancy location defined in the Enforcement and Inspection Guide. Here, 
the crucial check objectives were the evacuation areas and the safety signs. 
More specifically, the check objectives included inspecting the evacuation 
passageway, safety exit, emergency lighting, emergency exit signs, the 
evacuation signs, indication signs, and signs prohibiting entrance (Work 
Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006).
Mr. Z first checked the evacuation passageway and evacuation signage. 
The evacuation passageway was unblocked and led to an emergency door. 
After that, we went to the safety door and emergency exit sign. According to 
the state standards, a safety door width should be not less than 1.4 meters 
(Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006). It should be open to 
the evacuation direction. The safety door should be unblocked, it was 
forbidden to install a curtain or any other obstructions near the safety door. 
During the business hours, safety doors cannot be locked or blocked. After 
checking the safety door of this theatre, we found that it conformed to the said 
standards. All signs were clearly visible and observably so (Author Fieldnotes, 
April 4, 2013).
The next inspection check objective was the emergency lighting system in 
the facility. The state regulations stipulate that evacuation passageways 
should install emergency lighting in order to ensure the use of emergency 
lighting, and it should usually be operating properly (Work Safety Enforcement 
and Inspection Guide 2006). Mr. Z checked the running of the emergency 
lighting device system. Everything was said to be operating in proper order. 
The field inspection work by the team was coming to an overall quick 
conclusion. The safety manager and the SAWS team returned to the front of 
the facility and were seated in the coffee shop once again where we had 
started our day. People who were in charge of the large assembly occupancy 
area and the Central Control Room came to the cafe and were seated with us 
altogether as a group. The management offered us some tea and everyone 
drank some tea. The tea was very good quality and a very expensive tea. All 
the management system codes and contingency plans were on the table. One 
of the other labour inspectors who spent their time reviewing these documents 
while we moved around the facility had finished checking all the documents 
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and was describing the results and the findings (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 
2013).
The facility "Management System Assembly” was the main management 
system of the establishment. It included two parts. The first part was the public 
management system and the second part was the post responsibilities and 
work procedures. The first part consisted of an employee handbook, the 
personnel management system, the work attendance checking system, the 
rewards and disciplinary system, the salary and welfare management system, 
and the production safety management system. The labour inspection 
focused on the production safety management system. This section included 
the supervision and administration of production safety, emergency rescue, 
investigation and handling of production safety accidents, and firefighting 
management. The individual labour inspector responsible for evaluating these 
documents considered that this management system assembly was very 
complete and detailed. It included and described various key positions, and it 
was comprehensive and reasonable. She suggested that the fire fighting 
management section should be separate and bound in a volume. As in 
regards to the assembly occupancy issue, fire prevention was the key issue 
that related to each employee’s safety, it was also the important inspection 
objective that had been identified previously at the district level of the labour 
inspectorate (Author Fieldnotes, April 4 2013). 
4.3 Wrapping up the inspection
All of the inspection processes had finished, and Mr. Z summarized the 
results of the whole inspection. He believed facility's “Management System 
Assembly” plan was excellent, giving his evaluation of the documents that he 
had not been able to review since he was busy going around the facility. The 
company just needed to separate the fire fighting management section from 
this assembly and bind it in a volume. He believed that the Central Control 
Room was perfect. All equipment was operating properly so that it was easy 
to make a judgment on accidents and then fixed in time. Mr. Z said that all 
equipment and facilities conformed to the state standards or to the industry 
standards. The quality of personal protective equipment of the electricians that 
included insulated boots, gloves and safety helmets, all conformed to either 
the state standards or industry standards. However, he indicated that all 
electricians must have an electrician license on the person at all work times. 
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The evacuation passageway of the main assembly area was found unblocked 
and safety signs were clearly visible (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).
According to Article 59 of the Production Safety Law of the PRC, “The 
supervision and inspection personnel of production safety shall make written 
records of the time and place of the inspection, what the inspection is about, 
the problems discovered and how they are dealt with, and affix their 
signatures of the inspectors and person-in-charge of the inspected entity.” The 
“written records” noted here mean the “on-site inspection record” (Production 
Safety Law of the PRC, Article 59). The report template is indicated in Photo 
3. It included the name of the unit being inspected, address, juridical person, 
position, inspection place, inspection time, inspection result, name of SAWS 
labour inspector, etc. One of the labour inspectors finished this record. He 
detailed the inspection process and the problems they had found. 
A complete on-site inspection record should also include the illegal acts 
and potential safety hazards checks, a deadline for rectification measures of 
illegal acts, and the results of compulsory measures for illegal acts (Work 
Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 2006). The employer did not 
receive any violations or were any potential safety hazards identified, and the 
labour inspector did not complete this section. The on-site inspection record 
was signed by the labour inspector and the person in charge of the unit being 
inspected. This was our labour inspection team leader Mr. Z and the facility 
safety manager, respectively (Author Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013).    
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Photo 3
The template of the on-site 
labour inspection record
Work Safety Enforcement and 
Inspection Guide 2006: 45
 Mr. Z gave the safety manager a “Notice of Production Safety” which was 
promulgated by the Administration of Work Safety local office. This notice 
referred to conformity to a “Star Grade” establishment on a safety production 
management requirement and the “Production Safety Law of the PRC”. It 
stipulated safety production standards and work safety standards for these 
types of facilities at the district level. This included the guarantee of production 
safety and business operation entities, and the rights and obligations of the 
employees. This requirement had been enacted for the purpose of 
strengthening the supervision and administration of production safety, 
preventing and reducing safety accidents, defending the worker safety (Author 
Fieldnotes, April 4, 2013). The manager signed this at the end of this notice.
At eleven o’clock, we finished the day's field inspection. The complete 
inspection took a little over one hour. We shook hands before saying 
goodbye. 
4.4 Reflections from my first-hand experience
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Although the simple act of accompanying a single team of Beijing-area 
occupational safety and health inspectors to one work-site on their daily 
routine is in many ways very limited, there are notable issues that this 
experience raises and helps to clarify for me. This visit helped contextualize 
my interviews with the other labour inspectors. I conclude with a series of my 
personal reflections on this brief experience in an attempt to draw some 
contextual lessons before moving on to the next chapter where I will discuss 
the results of my interviews with each labour inspector from this local SAWS 
inspection office.
My first observation relates to the hard law - soft law debate in labour 
standards enforcement. Typically, labour inspection is considered one of the 
main instruments of hard law standards enforcement. In the past, I always 
assumed the labour inspection process was tediously long and insipid, that 
labour inspectors were extremely strict with the entities being inspected and 
applied the law in an onerous way at the enterprise level. This is the most 
common understanding of labour inspection in a command control framework.
Although my experience with this labour inspection team was very short, 
this experience changed my point of view. Although the SAWS inspectors 
were wearing the same uniforms as the police force, each inspector's 
demeanour was very friendly and patient with the employer, almost 
deferential, which was intended to humanize the inspection system and the 
inspectors as the government advocates charged with enforcing the law. In 
conclusion, I tend to have a different view than the hard law opinion of labour 
inspection. Labour inspection may or may not be a hard law command and 
control type legal mechanism. The social relations were very deferential to the 
employer, besides notifying the management about when the inspection was 
to occur. This deference was an important observation for me. 
This deference carried over into how the SAWS inspectors cited either 
government laws or industry standards in the course of their inspection. The 
labour inspectors often indicated that compliance with either the state legal 
standards or the private industry standards were adequate. This indicates to 
me that there is a significant range of labour standards that street-level labour 
inspectors can cite in the course of an inspection. Indeed, in order to make an 
intelligent determination, the inspector must have knowledge of both the legal 
and industry standards. This gives the labour inspector more latitude to justify 
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intervening in the workplace as the industry standards offer them another 
body of standards to cite at the workplace level. However, the diversity of 
standards available for the inspectors could ultimately reduce their authority 
as agents of law enforcement, since it is adequate that employers can 
conform to either the legal standards or industry standards. If either of these 
standards is adequate to apply, leaving less room for the labour inspector to 
independently determine policy at the street-level since employers can argue 
that they are in compliance with either one or the other set of standards.  
What also might be happening is that the inspectors are using the range 
of standards to give them discretion to not rock the boat and enforce the legal 
standards, possibly permitting inspector deference even further. Thus this 
would mean discretion is being affected in a way to allow legal standards not 
to be enforced in a hard law way, as evidenced by the way the inspection 
team handled the electricians not having individual licences on their person, 
actions that were illegal but were not cited by the SAWS inspection team.
I was very surprised that the establishment we visited had such a thick 
production safety management assembly document concerning production 
safety and occupational safety and health. The OSH section of the assembly 
area was not separate from other parts but this section and is relatively 
detailed. It seems that the facility has established a complete system of 
documentation and responsibility for production safety. As for the electrician, 
who is a special operation staff member, they are provided with personal 
protective equipment that meets national standards or industrial standards. 
There was no illegal act that was ultimately cited by the labour inspectors, 
as a result, this team did not have any administrative penalty levied against 
them under the safety law. This decision itself could be interpreted as a 
demonstration of labour inspector discretion at the worksite level.  
According to the Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide, 
occupational health inspection was one part of the inspection work (Work 
Safety and Inspection Guide 2006). However, after being on-the-job with 
these front-line labour inspectors, I found that work safety and work health are 
treated as two very separate issues. The daily work of these labour inspectors 
involves a considerable focus on work safety inspection rather than on work 
health inspection. This phenomenon could be seen from both their “Work 
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Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide” or the on-site inspection that I 
observed. The Health Bureau at the district level is the public entity 
responsible for occupational health inspection, and joint teams are rare. 
A question that comes to my mind was whether some of the on-site 
inspection processes were planned, formalistic or even done in vain. At the 
beginning, Mr. Z raised a couple of questions about training issues. The 
manager mentioned that all training content, personnel, dates, and locations 
have been recorded. This issue was terminated by such a question-and-
answer format. However, how does one really make sure that employees 
master work safety knowledge? This was not clear to me. I considered that a 
better and simple way was to ask a random employee about this knowledge, 
but this did not happen in the labour inspection. The team was being escorted 
around the facility by the safety director and the department managers who 
were responsible for each area. There was no confidential dialog with 
workers. 
Another interesting point raised by this experience is that there was some 
overlap between worker health and safety issues and basic public safety. The 
nature of the work location meant there was overlap between what constituted 
worker safety and the public safety. This may or may not be wise, but the 
safety and health inspection team did not appear to necessarily distinguish 
between these two dimensions themselves. I left wondering if a specialized 
focus on only one of these areas was needed to do a more effective job at it.
In conclusion, this experience, however brief or even possibly artificial 
given the effect of my presence on the labour inspection itself, was valuable to 
help me to understand the general process of SAWS labour inspection and 
the review of the safety production management system within this local 
safety and health district. Such information helps give me a more in-depth 
understanding of occupational safety and health and helps me contextualize 
the rest of my findings. In concluding this chapter, however, I can summarize 
that I observed that there were key factors that appeared to influence the 
discretion of labour inspectors on-the-job. These included the divergence of 
standards through which enforcement was to occur allowing the inspectors 
the discretion to find the employer to be in conformity with a range of different 
safety standards, the separation of occupational safety and occupational 
health labour inspection, a general deference and conviviality between the 
83
inspection team and the worksite management, and general labour inspector 
discretion regarding when to cite employers when violations were observed.       
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Chapter 5 
Data analysis:
In-depth interviews with labour inspectors
This chapter describes the analysis of the other sources of collected data, 
documents and their analysis and in-depth interviews with labour inspectors. 
This chapter also includes a discussion of my research findings in relation to 
my five working research hypothesis as posited in an earlier chapter. The 
qualitative data analysis employed here is descriptive and entails a focus on 
answering my research questions and testing hypotheses with the available 
evidence. I will attempt to accomplish this task in this chapter.
5.1 Debating discretion in front-line inspection work
The overarching research question guiding this project is: What is the 
nature and latitude of a Chinese labour inspector’s discretion in the 
administration of work safety? There are two sub-questions. First, what are 
the factors that will influence a labour inspector’s discretion? Second, what 
difficulties, challenges and problems do street level public servants meet 
when enforcing the law of work safety and health? Answers to these 
questions are formulated on the basis of 12 in-depth-interviews with front-line 
labour inspectors in one local SAWS office located in the Beijing area and a 
systematic study of documents acquired from SAWS and the inspectors. 
The idea that street-level bureaucrats are policy makers has been well 
established in the academic literature. There is still considerable debate over 
whether discretion is, however, positive or negative. Applying this question to 
labour inspection connects to broader debates about the proper role for the 
labour inspection service. These debates range from seeing inspection as a 
more a consultative service versus a hard law command and control function. 
Understanding whether labour inspector discretion is negative or positive 
for labour standards enforcement is not an easy task. I observed and heard 
about both labour inspector discretion and lack of discretion shaping the work 
of the local SAWS officials. What is needed, therefore, is a close look at the 
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issue of how discretion plays out across a range of issues. Walking through 
my hypothesis one-by-one in light of the evidence collected helps in this task.  
One further complicating aspect of studying discretion is the problem of 
reaching the goals and objectives set out in policy. Lipsky did describe various 
conflicts that can occur within a bureaucratic system. One of these conflicts is 
that sometimes managers and street-level bureaucrats do not agree on either 
the organization’s goals or the objectives (Wright 2003). Having substantial 
discretion, street-level bureaucrats could also be shirking policy (Zinck 2009), 
as street-level workers "perceive their interests as separate from managers' 
interests, and they will seek to secure these interests" (Lipsky 1980). In these 
views, discretion is considered negative to realizing policy implementation.
Another negative view of discretion from the academic literature is unjust 
treatment to clients. Since the major responsibility of street-level bureaucrats 
is to provide governmental services to clients, their acts will have a direct 
impact on the client’s life. However, limited resources will lead to the question 
of quality of services (Wright 2003). “Street-level bureaucrats are not elected 
officials, and the democratic legitimacy of them taking independent, own 
decisions is therefore questionable” argue Tummers and Bekkers (2012). As a 
result, these authors underlie how distributing fair treatment to clients might 
not be guaranteed when a front-line public service worker holds discretion.
On the other side of this general debate about discretion, the literature 
more directly focused on labour inspection, while not expressly responding to 
Lipsky and the literature on street-level labour inspection, nonetheless argues 
that labour discretion inspection is, in contrast, a positive force. These writers 
emphasize that more discretion by inspectors could have positive effects. 
Piore and Schrank compared the labour inspection system between 
Europe and Latin America. They stated, “the advantage of the Franco-Latin 
model is the flexibility of the regulatory structure and the ability to adjust its 
impact to the peculiarities of particular enterprises and the broader socio-
economic environment” (2008). This flexibility stems from the discretion of the 
front-line inspectors. This view is also supported by Pires when he discusses 
the positive relationship between labour inspection and social and economic 
development (Piore and Schrank 2008: 8). 
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Furthermore, Tummers and Bekkers conversely conclude two potential 
positive effects of discretion, the first is enhanced client meaningfulness for 
clients and the second one is more willingness to implement the policy 
(Tummers and Bekkers 2012). In the case of labour inspection, in light of my 
walk-around with the SAWS labour inspection team reported in the previous 
chapter, one important caveat to this debate, however, must be raising the 
question, "Who is the client?" If the client is the employer, this might lead one 
to one view of the value of discretion. If the client is the worker, this might lead 
one to another view of the value of discretion.
There are still other scholars that remain neutral in the debate about 
whether front-line discretion is negative or positive. They state that discretion 
has both positive and negative aspects, which means “evaluation of the 
behaviour of street-level bureaucrats needs to be done on a case-by-case 
basis” and Evans and Harris noted that “increasing the number of rules and 
regulations that are placed on street level bureaucrats does not mean that 
there will be greater control over their actions and decisions” (Zinck 2009).
Accordingly, it seems that street-level bureaucracy discretion might have 
both positive and negative effects, and that any effects need to be considered 
on a case-by-case basis. Taking this more focused and nuanced debate on 
front-line worker discretion as my jumping-off point, I now turn to review each 
of my working hypotheses and identify the nuances of discretion in my case.
5.2 Collected evidence in light of my working hypotheses
SAWS labour inspectors work at the basic, local level office of what is a 
comprehensive, nationwide public administration bureaucracy. Each day, 
tasks are designated by their supervisors and labour inspectors must consult 
these tasks and later report his or her inspection results. These tasks imply a 
strong subordinate characteristic to the work. To avoid any unjust treatment or 
corruption, and to achieve the organizational goal, labour inspectors are 
restricted by various rules and regulations and policies. Despite these forms of 
control, however, we cannot come to the conclusion that there is no inspector 
discretion. This point of view is based on the theory that front-line discretion is 
inevitable (Tummers and Bekkers 2012). On site inspection work requires 
labour inspectors to make decisions in a short period of time without superior 
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guidance. It is impossible for front-line inspector to enforce all the rules across 
divergent settings and hence discretion exists (Tummers and Bekkers 2012).
The Chinese SAWS context is a case in point on this issue. I will now 
restate each of my working hypotheses and explore the question further in 
light of the interview and documentary evidence. 
Bureaucratic decision-making in general takes place under conditions of 
limited time and information. Decision makers typically are constrained by the 
costs of obtaining information relative to their resources. Street-level labour 
inspectors are no different. My first hypothesis focused on this phenomenon 
and explores whether inadequate resources influenced inspector discretion. 
The second hypothesis related to the Chinese workforce, especially 
migratory workers who bear tough jobs and shabby accommodations and 
always are the victims of accidents. I asked how these relations affected their 
work as labour inspectors and how they responded to these dynamics.
The third working hypothesis tried to establish the relationship between 
labour inspector discretion and any legal lacunae. Until recently, China did not 
enact a real occupational safety and health law and national policy and labour 
inspectors subsequently felt there were no laws and policy to fall back upon. 
My fourth hypothesis focused on performance measurements of human 
resource management of the labour inspectors themselves. Literature has 
suggested that the job performance of street-level bureaucracy is extremely 
difficult to measure (Lipsky 2010). The indicators under this hypothesis were 
training, performance measurement, their discipline and any reward system. 
According to the nature of my semi-structured interviews, there were bound to 
be some other factors affecting discretion that I explored during the process of 
interviewing. My last hypothesis was designed to focus on these factors.
Interview notes, field notes, and documentary evidence are my source of 
data here. Nearly all interviews were conducted in an open and friendly 
atmosphere. Labour inspectors gave me their cellphone numbers, and as a 
result I could contact each subject directly when having questions or for any 
follow-up questions. I conducted a total of 12 interviews with labour inspectors 
for this study. The average length of the interviews was between 30 and 45 
minutes with three follow-up telephone interviews that averaged 30 minutes 
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each. The following is my analysis of these interviews and the documentary 
evidence as it relates to each hypothesis.
H1: Labour inspector discretion is affected because inspectors do not 
have adequate resources to do their job.
The first challenge of front-line inspection as discussed in the literature 
review was limited resources. The indicators under this working hypothesis as 
I designed and described in the methodology chapter were tools needed to 
perform the job, out-of pocket expenses that labour inspectors have and the 
average ratio of workers to labour inspector.
All respondents responded that they were provided with cameras or audio 
recorders or other specific monitoring equipment when necessary to perform 
their job functions. While in the office, each labour inspector had a desktop 
computer. Printers, fax machines and scanners were in the common room. 
Furthermore, to ensure their own safety, labour inspectors were also equipped 
with special individual protection tools, for instance, protective clothing, safety 
helmets, etc., and theses tools were regularly updated. This is consistent with 
what I have found in my experience on-the-job with a labour inspection team. 
Most of the labour inspectors interviewed reported to me that they found the 
material resources to be adequate to perform the job. 
All respondents reported that they assumed no out-of-pocket expenses. 
They pointed out that although they assumed no travel expenses, each one 
was equipped with a bicycle or an electric bicycle. Thus the out-of-pocket 
expenses claim did not have any impact on labour inspector discretion. The 
SAWS district is located in the Beijing area. It is modest in size and public 
transportation is convenient, people are able to get to their destination easily. 
Sometime bicycle or electric bicycles are the best choice during the traffic 
jams (Labour Inspector Interview No. 1, Labour Inspector Interview No. 7, 
February 16, 2013).
Although the interviews with individual labour inspectors found that the 
material resources were reported as adequate to do the job, the documentary 
evidence provides a more complex picture. The literature provides evidence 
that the lack of resources is extremely severe in China.  According to the 
district bureau of statistics, up to the end of 2011, the number of employed 
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persons was between 500,000 and 600,000 (Statistics 2011). In stark 
contrast, the one respondent from the personnel department told me that 
there were only 18 front-line labour inspectors in this district level 
administration of work safety (Labour Inspector Interview No. 8, February 16, 
2013). This manpower to client ratio, as indicated in the literature on front-line 
work, is one of the particularly salient examples of organizational resource 
scarcity (Lipsky 2010). 
In this district the inspector to worker ratio was therefore one inspector to 
little more than every 30,000 workers. Common sense would indicate that 
there must be a sufficient number of people working to provide services with a 
relatively low degree of stress, consistent with expectations of provision. If the 
manpower / client ratio is extremely low, in our case, the labour inspector has 
to make decisions in a very short span of time. The inadequacy of resources 
contributed to what Lipsky called the “improvisational” ways in which the law 
enforcement can be carried out (Lipsky 2010). 
Although there were direct material resources available to each individual 
labour inspector in adequate supply and quality, systemically there were signs 
of resource scarcity through the staffing levels of the SAWS office. During the 
face-to-face interviews, more than one inspector complained about the burden 
of overtime work (Labour Inspector Interview No. 1, Labour Inspector 
Interview No. 8, 16 February 2013). One of the labour inspectors told me his 
work schedule on that day:
Before arriving at 10 o’clock, we had just finished a daily meeting. After 
the on-site inspection work, we would go back to the administration to 
sum up the morning’s work. In the afternoon, we also had several on-site 
inspection works (Labour Inspector Interview No. 10, April 4 2013). 
As a result, such a huge enterprise like the inspection I observed had to 
be condensed into only one hour as outlined and discussed in the previous 
chapter. The labour inspectors had to use their discretionary power and make 
their decisions quickly within a short time window. 
Clearly, the issue of resource scarcity of Chinese labour inspection thus 
appears to be a problem, but this issue is not material resource scarcity 
related to the tools and equipment needed to do the job on a routine basis. 
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Instead, this scarcity comes through short staffing of the public servants. This 
is similar to findings elsewhere in the literature on street-level bureaucracy. 
The average number of labour inspectors per workers in this district remains 
on the high end internationally. In fact, according to obligations under ILO 
standards, specifically ILO Convention No. 81 on Labour Inspection, the most 
industrialized countries must maintain an inspector-to-worker ratio of one 
inspector to every 10,000 workers. It would appear that this lack of staffing in 
SAWS is an important factor limiting the discretion of the front-line inspector. 
Given China's status as an industrialized country according to some of the 
latest international statistics cited in the opening chapters, in effect SAWS 
would need to triple the number of front-line labour inspectors in this office to 
be in compliance with the basic international convention on labour inspection.
H2: Labour inspector discretion is affected because China’s workforce is 
too migratory or precarious to assist inspectors in enforcing the law.
The second major theme that emerged from the data surrounds the use of 
migrant workers and dispatched workers and their impact on the discretion of 
labour inspectors. The district I visited had a resident population of over 90 
million with a migrant population between 20 and 25 million (Statistics 2011). 
When the inspectors were asked about any considerations which they made 
and took into account when facing worksites with a high percentage of rural 
migrant workers and dispatched workers, all respondents considered that 
there were no special laws or regulations giving special attention to these 
kinds of workers (Labour Inspector Interview No. 1, Labour Inspector Interview 
No. 7, February 16, 2013).
Being on the lowest rung of the social ladder, migrant workers can usually 
only find poorly paid and arduous jobs in coal mines, on construction sites, or 
in factories. Most victims of work-related accidents are migrant workers (Xin 
2013). Coal mining, construction and manufacturing are among the highest 
risk jobs (Fitzgerald et al. 2013). In view of these situations above, although 
there are no special treatments or special inspection contents for rural migrant 
workers or dispatched worker, the Enforcement and Inspection Guide has one 
special section for strategies related to high-risk industry inspections. These 
industries are hazardous chemicals enterprises, coal mines, firework factories, 
and construction enterprises where the migrant population is often larger than 
the other industries. For instance, in the case of construction enterprises, 
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there are specific inspection processes at key points. The inspection contents 
include two parts: Safety management inspections and field inspections (Work 
Safety and Inspection Guide 2006). The former means the inspection of 
enterprise’s regulations and rules, safety documents, such as the holding of a 
safety production license. The latter means the inspection of some key areas, 
such as lift shafts and other dangerous areas. For other high-risk industries, 
there were more detailed programmed labour inspection standards. As a 
result of these focused efforts where precarious workers worked, these efforts 
were cited as mitigating any problems faced by a precarious workforce.
Labour inspector discretion was however affected in an indirect way by 
the influence of migrant and dispatched workers. As one respondent said: 
“High risk industry where migrant workers cover such a large population will 
have more detailed inspection contents” (Labour Inspector Interview No. 7, 
February 16, 2013). The more dangerous the industry is, the more detailed 
inspection contents there would be. The district government encouraged law 
enforcement personnel to correctly apply the current laws, administrative 
regulations, and department rules, in order to narrow discretionary powers 
and address the issues raised by migrant and dispatched workers. As a result 
of these specially targeted inspection programs, discretion was thus cited as 
being narrowed as more specific enforcement programs controlled their 
action. In the industries where these targeted enforcement programs did not 
exist and similar workforce demographics were found, however, the 
challenging nature of a precarious clientele was reported. Thus there was a 
difference in and outside of these industries where special enforcement 
programs were found, but most of the respondents focused on the affects of 
the special programs.   
H3: Labour inspector discretion is limited because of undeveloped or 
undefined law with weak sanctions. 
The problem with the legal lacunae is mentioned in several studies and 
literature sources related to front-line public service work (Liu 2006; Zhang, 
Zhang et al. 2010). Most of the respondents interviewed for this study 
confirmed this phenomenon.
Cásale and Sivananthiran (2010) state that:
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The goal of labour law is to ensure that no employer will be allowed to 
impose and no worker will be obliged to accept conditions of work which 
fall below what is considered a decent threshold in a given society, at a 
given time. Thus, labour law is not just a means to regulate the exchange 
between labour and capital, in the way that civil and commercial law do 
with respect to civil and commercial exchanges; rather, it is a means to 
put into practice the ILO's Decent Work Agenda (Casale and 
Sivananthiran 2010).
The influence of the current labour laws on labour inspector discretion could 
be reflected in two extremes: Too detailed legal provisions that serve to limit 
labour inspector discretion, and on the other hand, labour inspectors cannot 
use this discretion power because there is no law they could fall back upon.
According to the Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide, the 
preparation before inspection comprises six steps: Understand the entities 
being inspected, identification and training of the labour inspector, consult all 
related laws and regulations, prepare an inspection syllabus and inspection 
sheet, prepare the equipment and materials, and divide the labour inspectors. 
The second part of the whole inspection process is on-site inspection work. 
The last part is the handling of the inspection result where labour inspector 
discretion plays a crucial role (Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection Guide 
2006, Chapter 3). It means that labour inspectors have the power to decide 
whether to give a lighter or mitigated punishment or a heavier punishment. It 
is the discretion of the inspector within the scope of administrative penalty.
In fact, each of the labour inspector’s acts was cited as restricted by strict 
legal standards. This restraint could be reflected from the whole process of 
inspection work and two types of administrative penalty procedures: Summary 
procedure and ordinary procedure. Summary procedure applies to where “If 
the facts about a violation of law are well-attested and there are legal basis 
and if, the citizen involved is to be fined not more than 50 yuan or the legal 
person or other organization involved is to be fined not more than 1,000 yuan 
or a disciplinary warning is to be given”, such administrative penalty may be 
decided on the spot by a labour inspector (Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Administrative Penalty, Article 33). Except the summary procedure 
above, where the administrative punishment may be given on the spot, the 
administrative organ, finding that administrative punishment shall according to 
law be inflicted on a citizen, legal person or other organization for their acts, 
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must conduct an overall, objective, fair and just investigation, collect relevant 
evidence, or may conduct, when necessary, an inspection according to law or 
regulations. No less than two inspectors shall be present on the scene when 
the administrative organ conducts an investigation or an inspection. The 
administrative organ before making a decision on the administrative 
punishment such as ordering to stop production and business, withdrawing 
the permit or license, or large sum of fine, shall advise the party of the right to 
a hearing (Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalty, 
Article 36 and Article 37). These laws dealing with rights to appeal the citation 
were cited as impacting the work of the front-line labour inspectors.
Furthermore, in order to avoid what it calls unjust punishment, the Beijing 
Administration of Work Safety has issued “Work Safety Administrative Penalty 
Discretion Standards” (Work Safety and Inspection Guide 2006). This 
regulation has summarized the foundation of punishment and has refined the 
amount of fines which means for which kind of illegal acts shall be imposed for 
the maximum amount of the fines or the minimum amount of the fines. These 
regulations further restrict the discretion of the labour inspectors actions.
For instance, according to the Production Safety Law, “The production 
and business operation entities shall offer education and training programs to 
the employees thereof regarding production safety so as to ensure that the 
employees have the necessary knowledge of production safety, know the 
relevant regulations and rules for safe production and the rules for safe 
operation, and master the skills for safe operation for their own positions.” It 
also states “Where any production and business operation entities employs 
any new technique, new technology, new material or new equipment, it must 
know and have good understanding of the safety and technical feature 
thereof, take effective measures for safety production and give special 
education and training programs to the employees concerned about 
production safety” (Production Safety Law of the People's Republic of China, 
Article 4). The penalty is that “the production and business operation entity 
shall be ordered to make amends within a prescribed time period. If it fails to 
make amends in the prescribed time period, it shall be ordered to suspend 
production or business for rectifications, and may be fined not more than 
20,000 yuan or about $3,000 (Work Safety Administrative Penalty Discretion 
Standards, 10). 
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These detailed regulations detailing when to levy fines and the amount of 
these fines were cited by several inspectors who indicated to me that they had 
limited discretion or even no discretion in power on this point. Each project 
has a stringent inspection method and content, and at the same time, each 
has a detailed administrative penalty the regulation has to obey. Considering 
this evidence in light of the low inspector to worker ration cited above, these 
regulations effectively served to limit the labour inspectors from making major 
citations or production closures without appeal in order to send a message to 
hazardous firms as a basic action that might mitigate their low staffing levels. 
Ironically, the local district government is trying to establish a complete 
legislation system and is in the process of regularizing the enforcement of the 
administrative law on production safety in order to encourage law enforcement 
personnel to correctly apply production safety laws, administrative regulations 
and to narrow their discretionary powers. All front line inspectors interviewed 
for this project, however, felt that despite this body of laws and rules and the 
local reform effort, sometimes there were no laws to fall back on in their work. 
One respondent took an example of an "exit passageway" (Labour Inspector 
Interview No. 7, February 16, 2013). The law obligates that exit passageways 
should be kept clear, and should not be piling up debris. However, there are 
no penalties. Does this mean that if there are any enterprises in violation of 
this law, there is no punitive measure? Another labour inspector interviewed 
felt that the law prescribed in detail the correct behaviours required of each 
enterprise, but there were few provisions for effective penalties the inspectors 
could use related to when the employer's behaviour was deemed hazardous. 
One of the reasons of this phenomenon is the lacunae of the current work 
safety laws regime. The most important law concerning occupational safety 
and health is the Safety Production Law (Pringle and Frost 2003). All of the 
respondents interviewed stated that this law was the essential one when they 
were performing their labour inspection work. Enacted in 2002, the Safety 
Production Law stipulates “Fourteen (14) basic systems and/or measures 
concerning occupational safety and health. These basic systems are limited to 
the prevention of production accidents at the enterprise level (Pringle and 
Frost 2003).” The important stipulations state that: 
A production unit must meet all the relevant laws, regulations, and 
industry-specific laws (such as the Coal Safety Law) otherwise it may not 
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undertake production activities. An enterprise must appoint an individual 
who is responsible for all aspects of safety. An enterprise must implement 
a system of education, training, and assessment of the safety knowledge 
of the OHS directors (that is, personnel with overall responsibility), OHS 
managers, and workers. Enterprises must implement a system of three 
simultaneous OHS measures at all stages of all projects; that is, OHS 
measures should be evident at the planning stage, during construction (of 
the plant), and when production is under way. Production units must 
register exceptionally dangerous hazards with the local safety 
inspectorate. Enterprises must implement a safety management system 
specifically addressing workplaces where explosives, working at height, 
and other dangers are involved (Pringle and Frost 2003). 
However, it was noted that the present law mainly focuses on production 
safety. "Safety production" is defined as “to prevent and reduce risk factors in 
the production process and to defend the safety of production.” Meanwhile, 
according to a major OSH glossary “Occupational safety and health is an area 
concerned with protecting the safety, health and welfare of people engaged in 
work or employment" (OSH Glossary 2008). The goals of occupational safety 
and health programs are "fostering a safe and healthy work environment” and 
“safety production” and OSH are two interrelated concepts of different areas. 
The former is “production-oriented” pursuing production safety; the latter is 
“people-oriented” focused on employee safety.
In addition, according to the Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection 
Guide, occupational health is also one of the inspection objectives. However, 
the Production Safety Law doesn't have any articles concerning occupational 
health. That is because occupational safety and occupational health are two 
distinct terms. Occupational health was, until recently, under the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Health. “By decision of the State Council, SAWS established 
an OH Department in 2008. Under the Interim Rules on the Administration of 
OH in Workplaces issued in 2009, SAWS duties in OH inspection were 
determined and now cover a wide range” (Arrigo et al. 2011). 
The Code of Occupational Disease Prevention of PRC applies to the 
occupational disease prevention activities within the territory of PRC, yet the 
Safety Production Law is limited to the prevention of production accidents. 
The Law of the Peoples Republic of China on Safety in Mines is formulated for 
the purpose of ensuring safety in production in mines, preventing accidents 
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and protecting personal safety of workers and staff at mines and promoting 
the development of mining industry, and the Fire Control Law of the People's 
Republic of China is formulated in the purpose of preventing fire and reducing 
fire damage, safeguarding citizen's personal security, public property and civil 
assets, upholding public security and ensuring the smooth construction of the 
socialist modernization. 
Each law focuses on one aspect of occupational safety and health. As a 
result, the important issue of legal coherency cannot always be guaranteed. 
As one labour inspector mentioned, both the local fire brigade department and 
the administration of work safety are responsible for the fire control and each 
of them has their own standards. However, he usually found that sometimes 
these standards are not at all mutually compatible or these standards focus on 
different aspects (Labour Inspector Interview No. 4, February 16, 2013). The 
entities being inspected may meet the requirements of the Fire Brigade 
Department but at the same time, they may be against the standards made by 
the Work Safety Administration. Sometimes the labour inspector is at his wits’ 
end when facing such problems of multiple standards in their enforcement 
efforts. In this context, the lacuna of the law is neither too lax nor too stringent 
a framework of norms, but rather a multiple complex of norms said to regulate 
the same activity. Inspector discretion is affected by divergent standardization 
and this complex of regulatory norms that speak differently to the same issue. 
This is only made more complex when introducing industry standards to the 
mix as was the case with the SAWS inspection team I joined on a site visit. 
The legal lacunae of work safety law was also found in the insufficient 
penalty measures described in the interviews and the documentary evidence. 
The Enforcement and Inspection Guide stipulates numerous standards on 
safety production. Take the example of “exit passageway” once again. The 
manual has one section named the Special Content of Safety Production 
Inspection. This section, as the on-the-ground guide for labour inspectors, 
attempts to synthesize the multiple legal frameworks that apply into a single 
cohesive inspection guidance document. It therefore comprises the hazardous 
chemicals inspection, Coal Mines inspection, fireworks production inspection, 
construction unit inspection, assembly occupancies inspection, etc. Each 
special inspection stipulates, “exit passageways should be kept clear, and 
should not be piling up debris” (Work Safety Enforcement and Inspection 
Guide 2006). However, there is no administrative penalty. Labour inspectors 
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have no punishment measures where the entities violate this standard 
regarding the exit passageway. Thus there is a multitude of standards and 
even when they do say the same thing, again, the penalties are lacking.
H4: Labour inspector discretion is limited because labour inspectors are 
too focused on narrow performance evaluation metrics.
This fourth hypothesis refers to professional training, performance 
measurement, human resource management, and the discipline and reward 
system issues. The Department of Legal Publicity inside the local work safety 
administration is responsible for the training of labour inspectors. Training 
includes the interpretation of the work guidelines and the latest laws, policies, 
regulations, field investigation, etc. (Author Fieldnotes, February 16, 2013).
According to a survey of one city in China, fewer than 30% of the labour 
inspectors when hired had any inspection related work experience (Liu 2006). 
This district administration is in the same tight place. One respondent from the 
local human resources department gave me a brief demographic description 
of the current front-line labour inspectors. The average age was 30 years old, 
each of them has a bachelor degree or above. The average length of working 
experience was one or two years. Their track record included village officials, 
a demobilized soldier, and a former police officer. Some level of professional 
experience may be required before they are hired. For instance, the candidate 
with a bachelor degree of safety and environmental engineering will be given 
a top priority, but this requirement is not fixed and it might not meet the office's 
practical needs at a particular time of hiring, so there is freedom to hire 
outside of these rules (Labour Inspector Interview No. 2, February 16, 2013).
Labour inspectors have face-to-face encounters with different clients and 
have to deal with a large number of complex cases, and thus make decisions 
in a short span of time. This knowledge and skill cannot be obtained through 
training, even when part of this ability is attributable to the nature of their job. 
Lipsky defined this phenomenon as a lack of personal resources (2010). 
He believed that street-level bureaucrats might lack the personal resources 
they need in conducting their work. They may be untrained or inexperienced, 
lacking tacit on-the-job knowledge that comes with a longer tenure. New 
labour inspectors are normally untrained in interaction with their clients.
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Inadequate personal resources directly influenced the labour inspector's 
discretion. He may be confused about how to identify the nature of the facts, 
the seriousness of the circumstances and confused about how to take the 
necessary measures to improve the situation with their enforcement power. 
For example, according to Article 44 of Measures on Administrative 
Penalties Against Illegal Acts Concerning Work Safety, “the production and 
business operation entities reject or obstruct the supervision and inspection 
personnel shall be imposed upon a fine of not less that 10,000 yuan but not 
more than 30,000 yuan or a warning” (Measures on Administrative Penalties 
against Illegal Acts Concerning Work Safety, Article 44). However, how to 
define “obstruct” is a question for front-line labour inspectors to define on their 
own accord on the ground.  Also, it is easy to define when “the circumstances 
are serious” but “relatively minor circumstances” are harder to define in the 
current labour laws. However, there is no standard to identify the seriousness 
of the circumstances so this in turn affects labour inspector discretion. 
Finally, according to Article 51 on Measures on Administrative Penalties 
Against Illegal Acts Concerning Work Safety, it says 
In case of failure by the party to execute the decision on administrative 
punishment within the prescribed time limit, the administrative organ 
making the decision on the punishment may take the following 
measures: In case of failure to pay the fine in time, an additional fine 
shall be imposed amounting to three per cent of the original fine on a 
daily rate basis; in accordance with law, the sealed up or seized 
property can be put to auction to pay, or appropriation of the frozen 
bank deposit can be made for payment of, the fine; or apply to the 
people’s court for enforcement” (Measures on Administrative Penalties 
against Illegal Acts Concerning Work Safety, Article 51). 
The labour inspector clearly has the authority to choose the measures. The 
inadequate interpersonal resources, as defined by Lipsky and suggested by a 
number of labour inspectors interviewed for this study, are a more striking 
weakness since the laws do permit a degree of strong action. 
Another indicator under this hypothesis is performance measurement. 
Goal ambiguity, intrinsic to street-level bureaucracies, affects performance 
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measurement. At the same time, there are too many variables to take into 
account to make evaluation realistic (Lipsky 2010). The respondent from the 
human resources department gave me an unequivocal answer; the front-line 
inspectors considered that there was no definite performance measurement 
system. Each day, they had some fixed inspection tasks; these tasks may be 
assigned by a superior or a tip-off they receive from the public. There was no 
minimum monthly amount of fines or the number of illegal units that needed to 
be visited. The violation identification and the amount of fines were strictly to 
be in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, which themselves had a 
degree of uncertainty and latitude (Author Fieldnotes, February 16, 2013). 
The same situation applies to the discipline and reward system of the 
labour inspectors.  One interview respondent answered that there is hardly 
any reward or discipline measures available in this Work Safety Administration 
as the performance of front line labour inspectors was very difficult to measure 
(Labour Inspection Interview No. 2, February 16, 2013). These responses are 
consistent with the general literature on evaluating front-line service work.
According to the Civil Servant Law in 2006, the law essentially regulating 
the employment of labour inspectors, 
The levels of leading posts are classified into chiefs at the state level, 
deputies at the state level, chiefs at the provincial and ministerial level, 
deputies at the provincial and ministerial level, chiefs at the department 
and bureau level, deputies at the department and bureau level, chiefs 
at the county and section level, deputies at the county and section 
level, chiefs at the township and sub-division level and deputies at the 
township and sub-division level (Civil Servant Law of the People's 
Republic of China, Article 16). 
The non-leading posts in comprehensive administration shall be inspectors, 
deputy inspectors, researchers, deputy researchers, division directors, deputy 
division director, division personnel and clerks. Front-line labour inspector is at 
this very basic level: Division personnel and clerks (Interim Regulation on the 
Appointment, Dismissal, Promotion, and Demotion of Civil Servants, Article 
19). Candidates to be promoted from this post to a higher post of deputy 
division director generally must have worked at the division personnel and 
clerks post for at least three years (Author Fieldnotes, February 16, 2013). 
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Besides these basic requirements, promotion includes a democratic 
recommendation of the party committee at the same level or by the higher-
level organization or personnel department. This includes interviews with a 
number of leading officials in his or her own department, examinations, etc. 
(Author Fieldnotes, February 16, 2013). Complicating this is that civil servants 
are not necessarily required to be members of the Party. In fact, most of the 
rank and file civil servants do not hold a party membership (Author Fieldnotes, 
16 February 2013). However, one labour inspector that I interviewed stated 
that a party membership was also an important factor of promotion (Labour 
Inspector Interview No. 5, February 16, 2013). This means that there is a 
degree of real political involvement in the promotion of labour inspectors 
beyond the standard workplace politics often faced in a bureaucratic setting.
It can be concluded, then, that three years of service, a recommendation 
from the party, interviews, and exams comprise the requirements of 
promotion, and a party membership is an important factor. It is thus very 
difficult to link the promotion to work performance given this setup. As one 
respondent said “Each inspector’s work capacity is almost the same. One 
labour inspector may have the support of the relevant leader if they have 
coordination ability and organizational capacity.” The so-called capacity here 
means, to some extent, to solve the problems with one’s interpersonal 
relationships on their own accord.  As noted above, however, the issue of 
“coherency” cannot always be guaranteed. As one labour inspector 
interviewed mentioned:
The entities being inspected meet the requirements of the Fire Brigade 
Department but at the same time they may be against the standards 
made by the our Work Safety Administration. However, if I know 
someone working in the Fire Brigade Department, I could contact him 
directly, he could bring pressure to bear upon the entities or we could 
make a joint team. The problem will be solved and that is my exclusive 
ability (Labour Inspector Interview No. 5, February 16, 2013). 
Here the relevant leaders focus on this problem-solving ability buttressed by 
an inspector’s interpersonal relations and connections. 
Accordingly, a performance measurement, discipline and reward system 
would thus not affect labour inspector discretion in a direct way since none of 
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these systems existed effectively. Furthermore, the existing promotion system 
is unrelated with either performance measurement or the discipline and 
reward system. The result of the absence of a performance measurement 
system may, however, influence the discretion of labour inspectors in other 
ways. For example, not having standard systems for evaluating performance 
could allow de facto unwritten norms to develop in lieu of an overt process 
which in turn could influence labour inspector decision-making. Evidence on 
this point from interviews and documentary evidence was not clear, however, 
yet the informalities of the formal promotion system described above was 
cited as being an important factor considered in how inspectors do their work.
H5:  Labour inspector discretion is limited because of other factors not 
considered previously.
A semi-structured interview combines a pre-determined set of open 
questions with the opportunity for the interviewer to explore particular themes 
or responses further. This was especially the case for the last part of my 
interview that did not limit respondents to answering a set of pre-determined 
questions. The results showed some other key factors cited as affecting either 
directly or indirectly a labour inspector's discretion and decision-making 
power. I have identified three factors from the interviews to highlight in this 
category. 
First, the labour inspectors interviewed for this study considered the lack 
of administrative enforcement power to be a serious problem. The weak 
enforcement power framework overall within which they must work makes 
their jobs a very difficult task. As one inspector said:
I could not communicate directly with the enterprise legal person or the 
responsible person able to change the situation. Worse still, the 
responsible person would produce various excuses to avoid meeting 
with the labour inspectors. What can I do then? Nothing else (Labour 
Inspector Interview No. 5, February 16, 2013). 
This evasion and the lack of administrative enforcement power to really 
get at the issue of concern and confront the decision-makers was cited by 
labour inspectors as having a negative influence on the rectification and 
reform of the enterprise and application of real safety and health protections. 
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Unlike police or customs agents, the labour inspector does not have the 
same administrative enforcement recognition or power. There are four 
exclusive rights provided by law to the labour inspector. The first of these is 
inspection powers, which means a labour inspector may make inspections at 
the production level and business operation entities, gather relevant materials, 
and inquire relevant entities and persons. Second is the administrative 
enforcement power, which means that a labour inspector shall order the 
problems to be eliminated without delay, if it finds any potential hazard in its 
inspections. If safety cannot be guaranteed before a serious potential accident 
is eliminated or in the process of elimination, it shall order the employees at 
work to leave the dangerous areas, and order that the business operation or 
production or use be suspended or terminated. Third is administrative 
penalties power, which means a labour inspector shall make decisions of 
administrative penalties according to the laws and regulations. Fourth is the 
power to seal up or detain, which means a labour inspector may seal up or 
detain the facilities, equipment and apparatuses that are believed as not 
meeting the national or industrial standards for guaranteeing safety (Measures 
on Administrative Penalties against Illegal Acts of Work Safety 2010).
Compared with police or other administrative organs, these powers are 
extremely weak. The Administrative Coercion Law of the PRC has stipulated 
five types of administrative coercive measures. They are restricting the 
personal freedom of a citizen, seizing premises, facilities or properties, 
impounding properties, freezing deposits or remittances and other 
administrative coercive measures (Administrative Coercion Law of the 
People's Republic of China, Article 9).  As a result, a person who refuses to 
accept a summons without justifiable reasons or evades a summons may 
compulsorily be summoned. This article may solve directly the problem that 
one respondent described during the interview where the responsible person 
evades and makes various excuses to avoid being inspected (Labour 
Inspector Interview No. 9, February 16, 2013). 
The Production Safety Law states that the departments responsible for 
the supervision and administration of production safety altogether, in their 
supervision and administration activities, cooperate with each other by way of 
joint inspections. However, no article stipulates the punishment measures if 
the entities violate the current law. Labour inspectors could not process their 
work if they cannot meet the responsible person. In addition, the power of seal 
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up or detain also has limitations. Labour inspectors shall seal up or detain the 
facilities, equipment and apparatuses, rather than the whole production 
operation place, as would be the power with other public agent inspectors.   
A second indicator described in the interviews under this general open 
hypothesis is current politics. One respondent believed that their inspection 
work was influenced by politics (Labour Inspector Interview No. 5, February 
16, 2013). For instance, during the National People's Congress and Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference, the entities close to the 
representatives would have more detailed inspections.  June is the month of 
safety production, and during this time the labour inspection work will be more 
detailed and strict (Author Fieldnotes, February 16, 2013 and April 4, 2013). 
On the other hand, if the entities being inspected indeed have difficulties, 
such as some family reasons and they have a good attitude or the violation is 
not serious, the labour inspectors shall give a lighter or mitigated punishment 
(Labour Inspector Interview No. 5, Labour Inspection Interview No. 6, 
February 16, 2013). However, whoever has repeatedly committed illegal acts 
or has a bad attitude shall be given a heavier punishment within legal limits.
Overall, a review of the evidence from the interviews and documents 
show that the discretion of front-line labour inspectors is a very complex 
relationship that cannot be reduced down to being either a negative or a 
positive factor in labour standards enforcement.  I will attempt to pull together 
and summarize this evidence further and draw a few conclusions for front line 
labour inspection work in the Chinese context in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 6:
Summary and conclusion
This final chapter presents the research thesis objectives and attempts to 
summarize the results, returning to the overall research question on the 
nature of labour inspector discretion posited in earlier chapters based on the 
evidence collected. I also place an emphasis on the overall contributions that 
this research work has attempted to make. At the end I attempt to draw out 
some key prospective points for developing future research on the topic of 
studying the discretion of front line labour inspectors enforcing worker rights.
6.1 Review of the research objectives
Nowadays, more than 80 percent of the Fortune 500 companies have 
entered the Chinese market.  “China has become one of the world’ s largest 
FDI recipients. More and more labour-intensive products, labeled ‘Made in 
China’ have appeared on the international market, making China likely to 
become a de facto world factory in the foreseeable future” (Yang 2006). 
However, China is often questioned by the ability to protect the interests 
of the Chinese working class. To improve this situation, China has ratified 25 
international labour conventions of which 22 remain in force (ILO 2012). The 
problem China faces is the problem of enforcing the law in practice. 
A fundamental area for study in Chinese labour relations scholarship is 
the workings of the street-level bureaucracy in labour administration and 
labour inspection. Labour inspectors are one typical example of street-level 
bureaucracy and are critical in the world of regulating labour and employment 
relations to achieve decent work and protect the human rights of workers. 
Lipsky has stated that street-level bureaucracies are the policy makers 
(Lipsky 2010). My research aims in this thesis has been to synthesize this 
literature with labour standards enforcement and to explore the nature and 
latitude of a Chinese labour inspector’s discretion in the administration of work 
safety. Some of my sub-questions included examining the factors which will 
influence labour inspector’s discretion and the difficulties, challenges and 
problems street level public servants in this Chinese context meet when 
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enforcing the law of work safety and health in attempt to conform national 
policy to basic international standards on occupational safety and health. 
6.2 Review of the research work
The main data collection method is the semi-structured interviews, a very 
flexible technique for small-scale research that can provide reliable, 
comparable and qualitative data (Drever 1995). Fieldnotes and documentary 
evidence were also chosen as part of my data collection methods. Based on 
Lipsky’s theory of street-level bureaucracy, I posited five focused working 
hypothesises which helped me focus to answer the research question on the 
nature of the discretion of the Chinese front line labour inspection service. 
This project examined one district-level governmental institution in the 
Beijing area, an undisclosed local SAWS office. This work safety 
administration was chosen because of its important situation in Beijing and 
because of my personal relationship where site access could be guaranteed. 
Data collection occurred between February and April of 2013. I went to the 
district level work safety administration in Beijing and made the face-to-face 
interviews. These interviews are my first data sources and I also collected 20 
additional pages of field notes that include my views about the interviews. 
They provide me rich information of what was happening during my research 
periods. Across all my field notes, this work is detailed as my experiences, 
values, and personal insights that resulted from my whole research process. I 
also followed a small group of labour inspectors to complete their field labour 
inspection work on the site of one workplace. This experience provided me 
direct perception and feelings of the inspectors’ daily work that enriched my 
insights. All the data were analyzed in light of my five working hypothesis. 
6.3 Summary of working hypothesis in light of the findings
The first hypothesis is that labour inspector discretion is affected because 
inspectors do not have adequate resources to do their job. The inadequate 
resource of Chinese labour inspection appears to be a problem, but this issue 
is not material resource scarcity related to the first indicators under this 
hypothesis such as tools and equipment needed to perform the job. Rather 
this scarcity comes through short staffing levels of the public servants. This 
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kind of inadequate resources influences labour inspector discretion being as 
how front-line labour inspectors have to make decisions in a short time.
My second hypothesis was that labour inspector discretion is affected 
because the Chinese workforce is too migratory or precarious to assist 
inspectors enforcing the law. Although the Guide has one section for high-risk 
industry inspections, there appeared no significant relationship between work 
force and labour inspector discretion that I observed during this study. It has a 
more indirect influence and targeted inspection programs mitigate this factor. 
The third hypothesis is labour inspector discretion is affected because of 
undeveloped or undefined laws with weak sanctions. Two aspects of the legal 
framework worked together to influence labour inspector discretion. On the 
one hand, too detailed legal provisions served to limit the labour inspector’s 
discretion. On the other hand, labour inspectors often had limitations on their 
discretionary power because there was no solid law to fall back on. What was 
observed was a mix of either too vague, restrictive, or complex legal frames.
Another important observation on this point is that labour inspector 
discretion was affected by conflicting or divergent standard regimes both 
across legal standards but also through citing private industry standards.
The fourth hypothesis is that labour inspector discretion was affected 
because labour inspectors are too focused on narrow performance evaluation 
metrics. This hypothesis refers to the human resources issue. The content of 
human resources is diverse, based on Lipsky’s theory, three indicators were 
chosen. A labour inspector may be undertrained or inexperienced.  Lipsky 
defined this phenomenon as a lack of personal resources (Lipsky 2010) that 
will influence directly labour inspector discretion. My research work finds this 
point of view evident. As for performance measurement and the discipline and 
reward system of the labour inspectors, evidence showed there was no direct 
relationship between these two indicators and labour inspector discretion. 
What was indicated was a bureaucratic civil servant system that prioritized 
personal relations versus any performance metrics related to effectiveness. 
The last hypothesis was a more general one. Labour inspector discretion 
is affected because of other factors not considered previously. The themes 
that were raised in the interviews included the failures of the administrative 
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enforcement power framework itself and the current politics. The respondents’ 
own particular skill level was also cited. The first two of these limited a labour 
inspector’s discretion overall and challenged their enforcement. The last one 
had a direct influence on discretion as an inspector’s experience or training 
made good judgments possible quickly rather than restricting their discretion.
6.4 The nature of the discretion of labour inspectors in China 
Little attention has been paid to the discretion and influence of labour 
inspectors as street-level bureaucrats, especially in the Chinese scholastic 
circles related to the labour sciences. My study contributes to the literature by 
exploring the nature and latitude of a Chinese labour inspector’s discretion in 
the administration of work safety and works to provide a framework for the 
integration of the study of street-level officials with labour inspection services.
What is the nature and latitude of a Chinese labour inspector’s 
discretion? This was my basic research question in this research project. The 
evidence I collected for this project shows that the discretion of labour 
inspectors is a more complex issue that the literature would like to indicate the 
issue to be. It seems that SAWS has enacted numerous regulations and rules 
that do define the latitude and scope of labour inspector’s discretionary power 
to reduce the negative effect of discretion on standards enforcement. 
However, the labour inspectors I spoke with did have a certain degree of 
discretion behind these hard laws and regulations. Despite the negative 
effects view of discretion, it is clear that discretion cannot be eliminated in 
labour inspection work given the complex variety of social settings a labour 
inspector interfaces with everyday. 
On a basic level, staffing ratios clearly limit inspector discretion. As the 
government might adjust their budgets to hire adequate inspectors, this would 
seem to contribute to positive discretion and in turn effective law enforcement. 
On this point the basic metrics used by the international community in their 
evaluation of labour inspection adequacy would appear to be valuable 
metrics. Likewise, targeted inspection programs for hazardous industries may 
help counteract weaknesses from a migratory or transient workforce.
A qualitative understanding of the mix of detailed labour standards and 
where labour standards should not be silent is needed to effectively leverage 
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labour inspection to make it work for implementing safety and health in 
practice on the ground. Because of the centralisation and control of trade 
unions in China, labour inspection effectiveness is a very important issue for 
labour standards enforcement. The complex overlapping variety of standards 
appears to limit inspector discretion through confusion. Basic lack of strong 
enforcement penalties on some issues also restricted discretion in a negative 
way for labour standards enforcement. Given the variety of overlapping norms 
available to inspectors, it might appear that discretion would be larger due to 
the variety of ways inspectors could act. More so, however, this complexity 
was described as just creating confusion and inspectors needed to find ways 
around these conflicting standards by communicating on an individual level.
On the human resources management issue, evidence showed that 
training was not always applicable to all situations but that the tacit on-the-job 
experience is more valuable in some cases. As a result, one could infer that 
labour inspector job tenure/length of experience could be considered a factor 
that contributes to positive discretion. At the same time, there does not appear 
to be any clear line of connection between a performance evaluation system 
and effective discretion from this study. Furthermore, it is not clear what a 
good performance evaluation system could be for labour inspectors given the 
unique nature of their work and the social context. What did appear to be 
happening was that the basic evaluation system for promotion was acting as 
the de facto performance evaluation system. This system affected discretion 
by placing higher importance on managing interpersonal situations on an 
individual level through social connections and at times party membership.
Current politics influenced labour inspection work, encouraging the work 
to be more detailed and strict based on politically expedient external needs. 
However, the weak legal power framework of labour inspection overall in 
comparison to other forms of state power limited labour inspector discretion in 
an unfavourable way for implementing national safety and health standards.
As with all qualitative research, the main limitation of my thesis is the 
problem of generalization. Convenience sampling was presented and used in 
this study as an ideal way to closely analyse the labour inspector’s view in one 
local office of the SAWS administration in the Beijing area. Beijing may not be 
able to represent the whole country, including regions of the country with 
large-scale industrial factories that are producing products traded around the 
109
world. The disparity of regional development is a fundamental characteristic of 
China’s national situation. Nevertheless, a qualitative study does allow for the 
exploration of issues in an in-depth way not possible using other methods.
One important contribution this thesis has made is the development of a 
framework for studying the influences of labour inspector discretion. One of 
the issues that arose in this study was how to define the relationship between 
labour inspector discretion and effective labour standards enforcement of the 
kind that is of concern to the international community. This critical relationship 
remains to be researched. What was observed in this qualitative study is how 
labour inspector discretion may be affected by factors to either restrict 
effective enforcement or promote enforcement. If this study were expanded 
and elaborated, a more detailed consideration of different factors would need 
to be made to determine which factors promote discretion and contribute to 
effective enforcement as well as restrict effective enforcement. Likewise, a 
more detailed consideration of factors would also be needed to determine 
which factors limit discretion in ways that likewise both contribute and detract 
from the effective enforcement of labour standards on safety and health.
What we are left with on the question of the nature of labour inspector 
discretion in the Chinese context is that discretion is influenced by factors that 
cause discretion to be limited and expanded, but that both of these results 
appear to either serve to support effective protection or conversely reduce 
worker protection. Thus the nature of discretion in the effective protection of 
workers by labour inspectors is a complex question that is issue-dependent. 
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Appendix A
SAWS Inspector Interview Guide / Questionnaire
1) Please introduce yourself (age, work experience, responsibilities, etc.).
2) How many SAWS labour inspectors are there in this administration?
3) How many labour inspectors are in your team?
4) What are the recruitment criteria of SAWS labour inspectors?
5) Is the object of inspection typically notified before each inspection?
6) Describe your work process to me in detail. 
7) What tools do you need to accomplish your job? How are you provided 
with these tools and are they sufficient? For example, cameras, voice 
recorders, transportation costs, etc.
8) Do you think these tools are enough to perform the job? If not, what are 
the necessary tools that you need?
9) Do you pay any out-of-pocket expenses?
10) How long you work everyday? Do you often work overtime? How does 
this affect your work?
11) How many inspection objects do you inspect every day? 
12) Do you take any special treatments with migratory or dispatched workers? 
What are they?
13) As for high-risk industries, are there any special inspection contents?
14) What are the contents of your professional training? Is it adequate?
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15) After training, is there any assessment or exam? What is it&
16) What are the performance measurements in your job?
17) Is there an amount of fines that you have to achieve every month?
18) What are the requirements to be promoted in your job?
19) Do you have any merit bonuses or similar allowances?
20) What is the most important factor in promotion?  How is it done?
21) Are there any problems in the law that you have found when working?
22) What will you do if the entities refuse to be inspected? What do you do?
23) What are your suggestions of reforming the current safety laws?
24) Is there any industry or sector that you will give priority to when 
performing work? Why? How?
25) Is there any collaboration with other government institutions? For 
example, the administration of occupational health or administration in 
other district? How does this happen?
26) Describe one of your memorable inspection experiences. Can you 
describe explain how you made your decisions?
27) Is there any other information you would like me know about your job?
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